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INTRODUCTION 
1. PROBLEM AND METHOD 
One of the most difficult things to do is to treat a 
- .- ... 
segment of Hege~'s t~~ught ~ iso~ation from his whole system. 
His works form an organic syst~m and to isol~te one section 
from the other is to be "abstract" and not "concrete." One 
... - '"' "' . 
of the purposes of this t~esis is to anal~ze the way Hegel's 
-philosophy_of_~istory f~~s-~~~0 _th~rest of his system. But 
the main purpose is to ascertain what princip2e Hegel uses 
""~ . ~ ,.. ~-.. . .. 
throughout_ his phi:!-osophy ~f h~s~o~y. ~any summary sentences 
can be given of Hege~!s_principle and his definition of 
. history. .Among them are : 
• ~ ... ..t .... 
1. 
·univers a1 His t"ory- -. • ... is· tlie exhibition of 
Spirit in the process Of working out the knowledge 
.of that which it is potentially.l 
The H~story of the·worla is none other t~an 
the progress of the consciousness of Freedom~ 
History is the exhibition of the divine, 
absolute development 6f Spirit in its highest 
forms-- tha~·graaatioh oy wh~cn it attains its 
truth and consciousness of itselt.3 
In terms of man, 
The History of tne·wrorld is·tne discipline 
of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into 
Hegel., PH, 18~ .. ' ·-
(This method of abbreviation in foothotes is essentially 
the following: las"t name or· author~ "first letters of 
main words· in title, ·and .. page nUm.ber. Full material is 
to be"found in the bibliography.) 
Ibid;; 19; 
!'O!'a.' 53. 
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obedience to ·a Universal principle and conferring 
subjective freedom.l 
........ 
In tern;ts of God, 
God governs the world; tlie actual working Of 
his government ~- tlie carrying out of his plan 
is the History of the World.2 
. .. . .. " ~ .. 
For Hegel, 11~eason ~s the S~ye~ei_!?;n_ of the World. • • • 
The his~ory of t~~ _world, ~her?fo~e, p~es?nts u~ with a rational 
process. uS The goal of that pr_oces~ _i_s f~~e_dom, the continual 
unfolding and de~eloP.ment~of t~e hi~h~s~ cap~c~ties of Spirit 
as we find such in man who of all creatures alone possesses 
... ~ . ... .. ... - " .. .... .. 
~eason and self-consciousness. 
.. "" . .. ~ . 
All these_ ab~~r~~~~ inc~mple~e definitions are well and 
goo~ excep~ _ t~t _we ~~~t se~ ~h~ ~ct~a.l meaning of these 
words unless we understand ~he~ connection !ith his system 
and what the words mea~ when Hegel ~es them.4 To understand 
them and to view some of their connections in his system is 
.. .. .. ~ .. . ... ,.. .. 
the purpose of Chapter I. This first chapter is an attempt 
-. ~.. ~ ... .. 
to und.erst~d what Heg~~ meB:lls by_ 11R~~son, n _"Spirit," and 
11Freedom11 anQ. to find o~~ _just What is the principle operating 
in the historical process. The di:f'fi~ult·r wi~ th;s method is 
that the discussion will be som~what abstract, and, accordingly, 
will do some injustice to Hegel. What Hegel insists upon 
1. Hegel; PH, 10~. 
2. Ibid., 36. 
3. 'I'5'Id: • , 9 • 
4. All excellent example of this is his use of the word 
"Freedom." 
2 
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all through his philosophy of history is that his principle 
must be applicable to the empirical facts. This is another 
way of saying that for Hegel all universals are concrete uni-
versals and are incomplete unt11 they are applied to the 
particulars. Or, rather, the particulars are contained in, 
and are an organic part of, the un~versal. 
The purpose of the second chapter 1s to give these 
particulars, 1. e. to show Hegel's application of his principle 
to the concrete facts of history. According to the Hegelian 
mode, the second chapter should be an organic part of the firat 
chapter. 
The third chapter will deal with some of the difficulties 
of Hegel's Philosophy of History. 
2. THE SUBJECT: nPHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY" 
The philosophy of history in its broadest extension 
encompasses the questions who we are, where we are, and how 
we got this way. It might include man 1 s reflection upon h~­
self, his future, and his present position in the universe. 
But this might be applied to the whole field of philosophy 
and especially to metaphysics. Historically, the philosophy 
of history has been connected with metaphysics and with the 
attempt to discover an over-all plan behind the course of 
history. But this attempt is not the only role of the philo-
sopher. The metaphysical ~plications of the thought of 
historians and, indeed, their speculation as to the historical 
3 
0 
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process i~self~ warrant a philosophica~ analysis. The selection, 
interpreta~ion, and evaluation of h~s~orical_fac~s entail assump-
tions perta~ning to the nature of ~~ the w?rld, and man's 
place in it. It could even be .~a~~aine~ that th~ rejection 
of any metaphys~c~l_imp~ications ~hats~ever i~ ~istor~cal inter-
pretations en~ails_ !-3- p~~,sJ?ective .Y~hi~h, when ana_lyzed, reveals 
metaphysical implications. We need not deny these implications, 
- - " .. ... 
thereby c?nfusing t~e _?:.ssue_. We need only to make their bases 
as clear and cohe~e!l~.-~s. P?.~ s il?~e-~. _ 
Much of the strong reaction against a philosophy of 
- .. J;._ ~ ... I< " 
history has come about by its connection with metaphysics and 
.. . 
the 11 apriori~m~1 of cert?-in Ph:~l~_sop~ical P:r'~nciples which have 
tended to mi~repre~en~ the.~ist~r~c~l facts.1 But this criti-
cism certainly does not invalidate all philosophies Of history, 
for 
not the principle of the philosophy of history 
but the way in which it is practiced is to be 
condemned. If the term is" "in baa repute' it is 
because·of tlie use which has .. been made of it; 
the conc~pt is s~ill le~~timate.2 . 
To un~erst~~ w~~:t ~he natUI_'e ?f. the_ philosc:>phy of 
history is, let us ~xamine some of ~-~s~ :f'~C?tions. The first 
function we might ~oo~ in~o_is its metaphysical function. This 
is to ttstudy the. principl~s of historiography, and first of all, 
their background, their causes and underlying laws, their mean-
l. 
2. 
This is essentially w; Winuelband's criticism of Hegel's 
history of philosophy. Cf •. Windelband, HP, 612. 
Berr and others, Art.(l932), 360. 
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ing and motivation. 111 The philosophy of h:I..story is performed 
~ 
in another way and that is to :I..nquire into the nature and 
validity of historical knowledge. Th:l.s function compares 
favorably with the Philosophy of Science. This is essential 
in any philosophy of h:I..story. 
Without a philosophical critique of these 
epistemological and methodological problems it 
~ would be di.fficul t to support the claim that the 
science of history can achieve a true phenomenal 
aefinit:i.on of history.2 . 
The methoaological and the metaphysical roles of philo-
sophy cannot ~e separated. They go hand in hand :l.n any 
analysis of a philosophy of history. This is especially true 
in the case of Hegel's philosophy of h:I..story~ Hegel's dialec-
tical method is an integral_part of his metaphys:I..cs and his 
philosophy of history is in organic connection with his meta-
physies.3 Any consideration of Hegel's philosophy of history 
ent&ils a consideration of this principle and the whole of 
which it is a part. 
History, not "natural history,n is what we are concerned 
~ -
about. Just as·man is a social animal so is he a historical 
animal. uHistoryn exists because of man. If there is a 
. -
historical reality, it is because men understand each other 
and "establish their thoughts in collective works, their con-
-duct in institutions, and benefit, at each instant, from the 
1. Runes (ed.), DP, 137. 
2. Lavely, Art.(l951~, 8. 
3. See McTaggart, SHD, for a minute study of Hegel's 
dialectic pr:I..ncip~e. 
5 
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collective acqu:i.sitions • 111 Also, social process itself is 
-inextr:i.cably bound up :i.n historical process. The philosopher 
must apply h:i.m.self :i.n udeterm:i.n:i.ng the proper character of 
historical ensembles: institutions, political systems, 
economic regimes, civilizations, and society as a whole.rr2 
The philosophy of history is indeed broad but if we are 
going to consider history at all the· necessity for :i.nterpreta-
tions of history is :Lm.possible to escape. Hegel realizes this 
gs well as the difficulty :i.n finding an adequate interpretation 
to account for all the 11facts. 113 OUr present environment 
naturally restricts us l.n our interpretations. We must have a 
certain perspective.. 11We cannot ignore the human agency in 
history. 114 But this a~.Knowledgment of relativity does not 
destroy all possibilities of knowledge and judgment. Rather 
"it is the outcome of comprehensive knowledge, and the means 
to further knowledge of mants history. "5 The tremendous amount 
-
of data gathered by the sociologists, anthropologists, and 
historians also makes interpretation necessary. The nature 
of these data forces upon us the a~ssion of the ~possibility 
of history and a philosophy of history becoming strictly 
scientific. But 11history is more generally scientific in 
1. .Aron, Art. (l~bO), 306. 
2. Ibid., 312. As to the problem of what .Kind of ent~ties 
EiiVe' histories, see Morton c. 1JI,'hite's article nAn 
Analytic Philosophy of History" in the same volume, 723. 
3.. Cf. Hegel, PM, 276f. 
4. Muller, UP, 40. 
5~ ~-~ 48. 
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spirit as it takes into account the reasons why it cannot be 
utterly objective or strictly scientif'ic in me'thod. 111 One of 
the most apparent reasons why we cannot generalize about history 
with scientific certainty 11is that we cannot isolate, measure, 
or grasp the multiple forces that determine it.tt2 
All this is by way of a defense of a philasophy of history. 
But what of the course of' history and the possibility of' a full 
meaning being discovered behind the historical process. The 
question Hegel asks: \~at is the significance of the entire 
course of the world's history? 
One of' the most importan~ concepts in the last three 
hundred years in the fields of physics, biology, psychology, 
and the philosophy of religion is the concept of process. 
We owe its greatest impetus to Hegel. He is the philosopher 
who has systematized history and given a philosophy of history 
~hich has brought into systematic combination the intellectual 
labor of' two thousand years. 3 His influence on future thinking 
was just as great. 
3. THE INFLUEliTCE OF HEGEL4 
The Hegelian thought and spirit has had a great impact 
' 
upon subsequent thought~· Bradley and Bosanquet may be numbered 
1. Muller, UP, 3b. 
2. Ibid., 36. 
3 • cr:-'windel band, HP, 612 • 
4. The following se.ction is based on E. S. Brightman's article 
on 11Hegel' s Influence in the Contemporary Social Situation)• 
in the Crozer Quarterll, January, 1935. 
7 
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among those who have been 1nfluenced by his logic. Marx and 
Engels have been influenced by Hegel's d~alect~eal principle 
also. Ne~ther Socialism nor Communism would be in its present 
f'orm if' it were not f'or Hegel. Fac:Lsm also had one f'oot in 
Hegelianism. In the principle of' the dialectic and the organ~c 
theory of' society Hegel has had a strong 1nf'luehce, not to 
mention the strong neo-Hegel~an movements in Italy (Croce and 
Gentile), in Germany (Glockner and Hoering), in Britain (T. H. 
Green, the Scotch schooi), and in America (the St. Louis school, 
Royce, Calkins, Creighton). Hegel enjoyed great 1nf'luence 
during his own t:im.e also. In the philosophy of' history, the 
s~udy of' Hegel is necessary to understand i~s la~er development 
in ter.ms of those who followed h~ and ~hose who reac~ed against 
his speculative philosophy of history. Despite these reac~ions 
against a speculative p~ilosophy of' history, Hegel does represent 
the f'~rst thorough and consistent ph2losophy of' ~s~ory. 
4. THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN HEGEL 1 S SYSTEM 
Logic or the sc1ence of' the Idea f'o.r~ a part of' the ~r:lad, 
Logic, Nature, and Spirit. Nature is the idea's externalization 
and f'orms the ant:lthes:Ls. Spir~t, or mental lif'e, represents 
the synthesis and the return of' Nature and the Idea to ~tself'. 
Within Spirit we have another tr~ad, subjective, objective, and 
absolute Spirit. History is treated in Hegel's Philosophl ~ 
~ (or Spirit) under the title of' "Un:tversal Historyn in 
1 ~ 
sections 548 - 552. It is under the section entitled 11The 
1. Hegel, PM, 27b. 
8 
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State" which is the synthesl.s of' Social Ethics which ~n turn 
is the synthesis of' Objective Spirit.1 The Philosophy ~ Right 
is another treatment of' Objective Spirit and at the end of' th:i.s 
book Hegel treats.World History.2 nHistory is mind f:spiritJ 
cloth2ng itself' w:tth the ~orms of' events or the ~ed:tate 
actuality of' nature."3 We shall throughout tms thesl.s use 
"Spiritu and 11M:tnd" as synonymous and interchangeable. 
1. Of. Hegel~ PM, 7. 
2. Knox, HPR, 216. 
3. ~-, 217. 
9 
CHAPTER I 
THE PRINCIPLE OF HISTORY 
1. TYPES OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Hegel begins h~s introduct~on to the Philosophy or 
Historl with a consideration of some of the methods of treating 
history. 
A· The first he calls "original history.n Writers of orl.gl.nal 
' 
history merely describe the events which took place during the 
writers' own time. Herodotus and Thucydides are examples of 
this type of historiography. They change the happenings of 
their own day or period into objects for the conceptive faculty. 
The writer's spirit and the actions he describes are one and 
the same for both are contemporaneous: What they put into the 
speeches and the orations of their subjects are simply uncor-
rupted transcripts of their own ~ntellectual and moral habits. 
Their aims, in the case of events, are to present the events 
to posterity as clearly as they themselves possessed the events 
through personal observations. These writers are li~ted by 
their subject matter and merely get a nglimpse of the great world 
through a miserable cranny."1 In modern times, the memoir 
literature represents this type of historiography. 
1. Hegel, PH, 4. 
10 
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B. T~e second type of' historiography is called the 11reflective." 
The wr~ter of' reflective history is not l~ited to the time in 
which he narrates his story. On the contrary, he tries to 
transcend his own time; his spirit is other than the period he 
treats. Accordingly, he must depend upon sources. The Roman 
bistor~an, Livy, is an example of this type. Hegel r~ghtly 
mainta~ns that a historian who tries to traverse long periods 
of time, or tries to be universal, must foreshorten its 
representations by abstract~ons.1 
1. nPragmatic" (didact~c) h~story writing is the first form 
~ ~ 
of reflective history. Pragmatic historiography reverts to 
flsimilaru circumstances in the past for the purposes of moral 
or pol~tical teac~ng in the present. Hegel is quite against 
this attempt: 11But what experience and history teach is this 
' 
that peoples and governments have never learned anything from 
history, or acted on principles deduced from it."2 
2. The second form of reflective history is the "Critical." 
These writers, prevalent in Hegel!s own day, especially in 
the field of philology, concern themselves with an investiga-
tion into the truth and credibility of historical literature 
1. Hegel, PH, 5. 
2. Ibid., 6. What Hegel is against here, though, seems to 
oe-the taking of' these past examples and literally follow-
i.ng the example. "It is only a thorough, liberal, compre-
hensive view of historical relations" that can be of use. (of. Ibid., 6-7). _ 
This passage quoted in the text itself also gives an 
indication of Hegel's negative attitude toward the possi-
bilit~es of historical prediction. He is ma~nly interested 
in explaining the past rationally. 
0 
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and historical facts. Hegel criticizes the extremes to which 
his contemporaries have gone in ttputt:t.ng subjective fancies in 
the place of historical data.ul · 
3. The last form of reflective history is the "Abstract." For 
" Hegel, it forms a transition to what he considers the ~portant 
type of historical analys1s: the Philosophical. Abstract 
. 
historiography is the histery of the specific sciences and 
special fields, e.g. the history of music, law, etc. Hegel 
asks an important question on this point: Are these various 
abstract histories which the. historian.gathers internally or 
externally related to each other? Are they merely peculiar 
and accl.dentaJ:. expressions ,or a nation or do they const:t.tute 
"an inward guiding SOU:ln Of the Occurrences and actions that 
~ 
occupy a nation's annals? Any knowledge of Hegel's thought 
would tell us that he maintal.ns that they are internally re-
lated. His insistence upon synoptic and organic pr~nciples 
tells us he is looking for an :t.nward guiding soul in historical 
processes. This brings us to the third type of historiography. 
c. It is the tasK of the Philosophical historian to take the 
historical material and weld l.t into a coherent story. "The 
most general definition that can be given, is, that the 
Philosophy of History means nothing but the thoughtful con-
1. Hegel, PH, 7. Many examp~es of this coUld be cl.ted today. 
The argument over the actua~ authorship of ShaKespeare's 
plays presents an ex~ple of this. It seems to this writer 
that the argument has been reduced to this: Shakespeare 
did not write the Shakespear:t.an plays. Someone exactly 
liKe h:I.m dl.d only 'he had a dJ.fferent name. 
12 
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s~derat~on of it."1 It is not the tasK of the Philosophy of 
\ 
History to amass the facts or collect the data but to obtain 
rational insight into their meaning and significance. This is 
true of any science based upon experience. These sciences 
ttexert upon the mind a st~ulus to overcome the form in which 
. 
13 
their varied contents are presented.and to elevate these contents 
to the ra.n!t of necessary truth. n2. In fact, history only attains 
~portance when it is exhibited in ~ts rational connections. 
Hegel sees the diff~culties in mainta1n~ng that a purely 
receptive attitude toward historical facts is the proper method 
in understanding it. The historian "brings his categeries with 
h~, and sees the phenomena presented to his mental vision, 
exclusively through these media."3 
~ 
In the act of knowing, the ~d is active. Hegel does not 
just mean that historical phenomena are apprehended under the 
categories of causality, time, space, etc. Whenever we have 
reason functioning as a thought-unity in and through differences, 
we have a category.4 The Hegelian categories are not abstract 
forms or molds with which we clamp upon reality or, in this-
case, history. We do not have on the one side consciousness 
1. Hegel, PH, 8. 
2. Wallace, LOH, 1~. In this connection Hegel says: "Experi-
mental physics w~ll present the rat~onal sc~ence of Nature 
-- as history will present the science of human affairs and 
act~ons -- in an external picture, which mirrors the philo-
sophic notion" (.!bid., 27). 
3. Hegel, PH, 11. ----
4. J".. B. Baillie maintai:ns that in Hegelian thought "we can 
treat a category as a specific realization of the"operation 
of reason, and can trace its source to the one supreme function 
of self-conscious mind11 (Baillie in Hegel, POM, 35). 
"with a reality per ~ over against it on the other. ttl For 
.Hegel, these two sides are one. The categories are·constitu-
tive of' reality. 
But we can carry this a step f'urther. For Hegel, the 
categories f'orm a plurality of' categories, an or-ganic system, 
and all are the expression of .the one supreme activity of 
reason.2 The task of the philosopher is not just to describe 
these categories abstractly but 11 to comprehend them as the 
moments of' a single unitary development. n3 This means for 
-
Hegel that to see each category in its significance it must 
be seen in relation to the Vv.hole and seen as moments of the 
Whole. The comprehension of' the Whole is the comprehension 
of' the Absolute. To comprehend historical events as moments 
within a single process and development is the task of the 
historian. Historical truth does not mean just correctness 
or just an accurate report of events.4 Historical truth is 
brought about by the comprehension of an event's significance 
in light of an aim towa~d which the process l2 moving and ~n 
light of the process of the Whole. Those historians who cla~ 
no presupposition under which to classify events are be.ing 
11impartial 11 at the e:x:pense of a significant narrative. This 
. 
is why Hegel says that the first category that occupies the 
attent:i.on of the historian is the one ttof deciding the simple 
1. Hegel, POM, 276. 
2. Of. Ibid., 3b.. 
3. Wino.elband, HP, 611. 
4. Cf.· Hegel, PM, 279. 
l~ 
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1 question of' the relat~ ve :t.mportance of events." In this·~ 
Hegel ~nsists that the histor1an get down to the heart of 
history writing: the meaning of history. 
But Hegel does not stop with the categor1es. For one who 
looKs upon the world and its history rationally they in tUrn 
present themselves as being rational through and through. H. 
G. Collingwood points out that Hegel 1s right: history is the. 
history of thought, of rationality. rrit is not knowing what 
' people did but understanding what they thought that is the 
proper definition of the historian's task. 112 For example, to 
understand a political conflict, the historian must see how 
the two parties conceived the situation. Hegel expresses this 
distinction more fully. In political history 
we see,.or at least d~vine 1n it, that essential 
connection 1n which the individual events have their 
place and relation to an end or a~, and ~ this way 
obtain significance. For the significant 1n history 
is such only through its relation to and connection 
with a Un1versal. To perceive this Universal is thus 
to apprehend ·the sign1f1cance.3 
We can see what Hegel is after. He is not after the 
universal, or principle, which would explain one political 
conflict, but the entire world's history. As Collingwood 
says, Hegel thinks he has the clue in the nature of thought 
and reason and its place in history. 
At the outset Hegel presents us with a hypothesis which 
1. Hegel, PH, 11. 
2. Collingwood, IH, 115. 
3. Hegel, HP, 6. 
15 
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he considers only a hypothes~s in the doma~n of history. In 
the domain of philosophy, or perhaps we should say metaphysics, 
he claims it to have been proven by speculative cognition and 
not just a hypothesis. This is 11 ••• that Reason is the 
Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world therefore 
presents us with a rational process. 111. But we must proceed 
-
empirically, historically. Hegel's hypothes~s must present 
itself as a result of historical study. Much follows from his 
view( of how and to what extent the world is rat~onal. 
Before we consider how and to what extent Hegel uses his 
principle of Reason, it would be fruitful to bring ~n just 
lti 
what Hegel is trying to do. He is not merely try~ng to prove 
that Reason rules the world, and consequently that world history 
too is a rat~onal process. That the historical p~ocess is ~ntel­
ligible is true for Hegel but not only~ that we can-discover 
the causal laws in th~s process but we can also know the grounds 
of this process. In other words, Hegel is asking the 11why 11 of 
history ~n two senses: (1) the tlwhy 11 connected with effic~ent 
causality; and (2) the u~hy 11 coru;;_ect~d with final cause. 2 He 
~ 
is looking for the meaning of the ent~re historical process. 
The empirical facts have already been established and the ques-
tions as to the legitimacy of these facts is not Hegel's concern. 
He ~s interested.-in the meaning of the whole pr.ocess, the why of 
1. Hegel, PH, 9. 
2. In th~s aspect of final cause, Hegel claims his subject 
ia a Theodicaea, a justification of the ways of God (Of. 
~., 457). 
both the eff~cient and final cause. Or, better, the final 
' cause gives him the ••:v1~y;tt the efficient cause the 11how. 11 
2. REASON . 
That the real is rational and the rational is real Hegel 
was con~inced and attempted to prove.1 The French Revolution 
had added to Hegel's conviction that the world of man is 
capable of becoming orderly and rational. 
Never since the sun had stood in the firmament 
and the planets revolved around h~ had it been per-
ceived that man's existence centers in his head, 
i.e. in Thought, ~nsp~red by which he builds up the 
world of real~ty. Anaxagoras had been ~irst to say 
that NOUS governs the World; but not until now had 
man advanced to the recognition of the princi~le 
t~at thought ou'§:lt·,to govern spiritual reality. 
A. Abstract Characteristics of Reason. 
Hegel's concept of reason is quite comprehensive. ·It iS 
the substance and infinite energy of the universe. It is its 
own basis of existence and its own final aim as well as the 
energizing power realizing this aim, " • • • develop:i.ng itself 
.. 
not only in the phenomena of the Natural, but also of the 
Spir:i.tual Universe -- the History o:f the World. 113 It is a 
1. T. M. Knox points out that nreal 11 does not mean existent but 
represents the synthesis of.essence and existence. What 1s 
actual, effective, is the wor~2ng out of God's rational 
purpose. Cf. Knox, PR, 302. 
2. Hegel, PH, 447. This statement set apart from Hegel's text 
as ~t ~s could be misleading. The French Revolution had 
only announced this principle and as yet viewed it only 
abstractly. 
3. Ibid., 9 • 
. -
0 
0 
... 
18 
vital princ~ple at work ~n the world and ~ its most concrete, 
~.e. most ~elusive, form ~s God. In fin~te persons, Reason ~s 
present as the~ absolute, substantial being. Man is explic~tly 
man only in the form of developed and cultivated reason, which 
has made ~tself to be what it is implic~tly. 
nReason is purposive act~vity."1 Talten abstractly ~ts 
. 
power of moving is its ex~stence for itself (fUr~). Reason 
is the highest fun~t~on of the mind. As this function ~t is 
self-complete and self-determ~ning according to its own inner 
law. It retains ~ts-contents w~thin itself. "Wherever we 
have a function of thought-unity in and through differences, 
there we have a category, and there we have the operation of 
reason.tt2 
For Hegel, reason denotes both the Providential design 
in human history and the basis beh~nd the movement of finite 
thought. Reason cannot govern reality until reality becomes 
rational through the efforts of man. The movement of thought 
and reason is seen to be, in Regel's system, constitutive of 
real:i.ty. "Objecti.ven real~ty is found to be for the subject. 
- . 
In fact, Hegel holds that being is, in its essence, a "subject." 
In other words, consciousness has been driven to see itself as 
1. Hegel, POM,.83. 
2. ~-, 34. 
0 
0 
object. "Reason is the certainty of be:tng all reality."1 
~ 
In the Lo&:tc, thought has followed a series of abstract 
predicates d:talect:tcally. But abstract reason (and its char-
acterist:tcs wh:tch we have given in this section) are only a 
partial view of reality. Reason and experience are not two 
distinct aspects of reality. The whole of experience is 
completely rational. Ideas somehow hold to a concrete appli-
cability. Thus the Idea to fully realize itself needs concrete 
embodiment. This is accomplished first in the externalizat~on 
of itself as nature and the "returning to" itself as concrete 
~ -
Spir:it. In history we have to do with Spirit. nHistory :in 
general :iS therefore the development of Spirit in ~' as 
Nature is the development of the Idea :in space. 112 
B. Reason's Rule. 
At the very outset Regel does not wish to have his concept 
of reason confused with the abstract concept of Anaxagoras who 
had not the power to apply his princ:iple to the concrete facts. 
19 
We cannot have a universal, the principle of Reason, without itS 
1. Hegel, POM, 276. This, of course, involves Hegel's 
epistemological position which :is monist:tc. Hegel's pro-
cedure in arr:tving at this position is questionable as is, 
it seems to this writer, his actual position in regards to 
epistemological monism. Whether he holds to ep:tstemolog:ical 
monism or epistemological dualism seems to depend upon 
whether one is looking at it in terms of the Absolute or 
in terms of the finite mind. Hegel says of Absolute knowl-
edge that '*since each moment has the form of the notion, :1t 
unites the_objective form of truth and the knowing self in 
an immediate unity" (Ibid., 805). The finite mind seems to 
be limited to whatever stage it has arrived. 
2. Hegel, PH, 72. 
c 
being concrete also. A pure universal, abstract concept does 
not help to explain the history of the world, i.e. the life of 
concrete individuals, just as an abstract conception of God 
20 
cannot help to explain religious experience and moral obligation.1 
We must also know the means it uses to rule the world as well as 
the pr2nciple to explain the negative elements which seem to go 
against this principle. We must understand 11that rich product· 
. . 2 
of active Reason which the History of the World of:f'ers us.tt 
3. SPIRIT 
Self-conscious Reason is Spirit. 
Reason is spir~t, when its certainty of being 
all reality has been raised to the level of truth, 
and reason is consciously aware of itself as its 
own world, and of the world as itself.3 
The self consciously unifies differences within itself 
and it is the function of Reason to synthesize these differences 
into a unity. Spirit is the unity of what is understood and the 
understanding person. But as this unity which, by virtue of its 
drive toward completion, is reflective, it must appear to itself.4 
What is confined within itself must become objective to itself 
and known. The manner and method of this objectivity is the 
1. This is one of the difficulties in Spinozistic thought. 
2. Hegel, PH, 15. Italics mine. 
3. Hegel, POM, 457. 
4. In the Phenomenology of Mind, experience is viewed as a 
dialectical process wnereoy-the subject becomes increas-
ingly conscious of itself as constituting its object. 
Spirit is this movement toward more complete experience, 
tnward totality and finally emerging into social 
consciousness. 
0 
manner and method of consciousness as well as the manner and 
method of the historical stages. But, as stated above, these 
differences are contained within Spirit itself. Subjective 
spirit is the potential realizing itself in the form of 
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·objective spirit. Josiah Royce rightly maintains that, ulti-· 
mately, this is only an inner differentiation of the Absolute 
itself.1 Spirit in its self-consciousness must become an object 
to itself. It is this objectivity that involves the differences 
which make up the distinct spheres of objective spirit. 
A. Abstract Characteristics of Spirit. 
T.he essence of Spirit is Freedom. Spirit is self-contained 
existence (Bei-~-selbst-~) which is equivalent to Freedom. 
It does not have its unity outside itself as does Matter. 
Matter has its unity and essence in gravity but Spirit has its 
unity and essence within itself.2 This is self-consciousness. 
Spirit knows itself. 
Self-consciousness is an ~portant concept in Hegelian 
thought. Hegel often uses self-consciousness as a stage in 
the process of Reason which we have found is another important 
Hegelian concept. Reason as a principle and a movement of 
thought is a purposive activity which arrives at the stage of 
self-consciousness or Spirit. Hegel uses the ttpurpose 11 .in a 
way similar to Aristotle. It carries with it the idea of 
potentiality, i.e. as a latent germ which becomes more explicit 
1. cr. Royce, LMI, 221. 
2. cr. Hegel, PH, 17. 
through growth. For Hegel purpose is an inner principle which, 
when realized, is concrete actuality. The purposive law or 
principle does not fall outside the activity. Hegel's is an 
organic concept of purpose and the essential nature of what is 
Grganic 
lies altogether rather in having its moments 
equally universal in concrete real2ty, i.e. in 
having them as permeating processes, and not in 
giving a copy of t~e universal ~the essential 
nature_7 in an isolated thing •••• But ••• 
the organism consists inherently in being simple 
universality, wherein all determinations are 
dissolved, and in being the process of this 
resolution.l 
We can see that Hegel's Philosophy £! Histor~ revolved around 
a teleological conception of the process of history. Purpose 
is a d~fficult concept to analyze. How purpose could exist 
without intelligence or, indeed, personality is impossible to 
conceive. This is one of the points which seem to indicate 
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that Hegel is conce~ving of the Absolute in terms of personality. 
But just as Spirit is self-consciousness, that which knows 
itself, it is also an energy able to realize itself. It, too, 
is purposive and can make actual that Which it is potentially. 
Universal history being in the realm of Spirit is defined as 
"that exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the 
2 knowledge o.f that which it is potentially," and that which 
-Spirit is potentially is Free. The realization that man is 
free is represented in history. nThe History of the World is 
1. Hegel, POM, 296. 
2. Hegel, PH, 18. 
none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom. ul 
Spirit's gradual consciousness of its own freedom is the final 
cause of the world. 
B. Freedom. 
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Freedom is Spirit in its completeness~ its essential nature. 
The concept of Freedom is essential in an understanding of 
Hegel's Philosophy £t History. What he means by freedom is 
self-contained existence. ni am free • • • when my existence 
depends upon myself. 112 Man~ by virtue of his own power of 
-
reason, can control his external conditions which limit his own 
self-realization. Man as a unifying agent can bring reason 
into the world and so realize bimself.3 Freedom is seen to 
have its embodiment in thought for only in thought can man be 
self-sufficient. This the Stoics realized in the principle that 
consciousness is essentially that which thinks, 
is a thinking reality, and that anything is really 
essential for consciousness, or is true and good, 
only when consciousness in dealini with it adopts 
the attitude of a thinking being. 
Freedom is often taken to be synonymous with "to be 
conscious of.u Toward the later stages of history man stands 
in a "conscious relation to his Spirit, and therefore a free 
relation. no 
1. Hegel, PH, 19. 
2 .. Ibid., 17 • 
3. TlllS is exemplified in man's overcoming natu.re. The institu-
tion of private property represents one of the first stages 
of th~s appropriation. Man has given himself 11into" private 
property and then projected his personality into it, thereby 
making proper~y a sphere of his own self-realization. 
4. Hegel, POM, 244. 
5. Hegel, PH, 103. 
0 
0 
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But the Stoics recognized only the notion of freedom. They 
w:I.thdrew into themselves to realize their freedom. Again, Hegel 
insists that this is merely abstract freedom and, as such, only 
part of the story and a transition. It lacks the 11 concrete 
filling of life. u It is not uli ving freedom. nl Self-conscious-
. ~ 
ness, or Spirit, has only trsought to save and keep itself at 
the expense of the world or its own actuality • • • ~ut now_7 
it discovers the world as its own new real world. "2. This is 
precise~y the stage and development of reason. Or, to make 
the connection between Reason and Freedom more explicit, 
nreason is thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom. "3 
This process, as we shall see, is the process of history. 
But the foregoing could be misleading until we see what 
the relationship is be~ween thought, will, and freedom. 
"Freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of 
the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized 
freedom. "4 Thought and ·will are not two separate faculties. 
11The wil~ is a special way of thinking; it is thought trans-
lating itself into reality; it is the ~pulse of thought to 
give itself reality."5 The will as well as thought a~ to 
-
appropriate its object. lY.hen we reflect upon our own desires 
and impulses they are compared and, through thought they are 
1. Of. Hegel, POM, 245. 
2. Ibid., 2?3. 
3. Hegel, PH, 13. 
4. Hegel, POR, 10. 
5. Ibid., 11. 
c 
0 
raised to abstract universality. This process Hegel calls 
11 thihking getting its own way in the will • • • It is only 
as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will 
and f'ree. 111 The will is f'ree :I.mplicitly and becomes explic-
itly f'ree. As ~plicitly free, it finds itself determined 
by nature. A free will is one which is self-sufficient, and 
self-sufficiency is dependent upon the work of thought and its 
transcendence of alienation. 
How can the individual will which has the capacity to see 
things as fiminen and "thinetl ever become the will of' "our" 
and thus express a common interest? The attainment of posi-
tive freedom requires that man leave his private interests and 
~ 2 
will general freedom as such. 
The principle af right, morality, and all f'orms of social 
ethics are forms of self-conscious freedom. Or, to put it 
differently, 11th.e ethical system is thus the conception of 
~ 
freedom developed into the present world, and also into the 
25 
nature of self-consciousness.u3 But what about a proper social 
~ 
order? All we have thus far is free wills asserting their 
individual needs. 
We must not forget that we are in the realm 
of Objective Mind, or Spirit, and that the develop-
ment of' freedom is • • • ~dentical with the moral 
reason of man as exhibited in an external system 
of social relations.4 
1. Knox, HPR, 30. 
2. or·. Marcuse, RR, 188. 
3. Hegel, POR, 155. 
4. Collingwood, IH, 144. 
0 
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We need an institution that would preserve ~ndividual 
wills and yet st~d above their competing relationships. We 
need this union between the part~cular and the universal. We 
need an identity bet~een the general and particular will. This 
we find in the state. 
• 
· The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom • 
~ this concrete freedom, personal individuality and 
its particular interests, as found in the family and 
civic community, have their complete development.l 
11Society and the State are the very conditions in which Freedom 
is realized.tt2 
The state is the goal of history as well as a standard 
by w~ch to measure the significance of an historical epoch. 
Historical advance is dependent upon man's ability to compre-
hend and be consc~ous of freedom a~ the goal of history and 
willing to make it so. Freedom here means the consciousness 
of freedom. 
The Philosophy of History exhibits the succes-
sive stages by which he ~ma~ reaches the consc~ous­
ness that it is ~ ~ inmost being that thus governs 
him -- i.e. a consciousness of self-determination or 
'Freedom.' 3 
In History, just as in the Phenomenology ~ ~' we 
have a movement of consciousness. Freedom does not exist as 
a natural and original state of man as :in. Rousseau. It must 
be sought and won. "Substantial Freedo.m is the abstract 
. 
undeveloped Reason implicit in volition, proceeding to develop 
1. Hegel, POR, 248 .• 
2. Hegel, PH, 41. 
3. Footnote by Sibree (ed~) in Hegel, PH,, 104. 
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1 itself in the State. 11 Historical development pres ent·s this 
-process along with and ih organic connection with the devel.op-
ment of subjective Freedom which is realized in the individual. 
As already stated, Freedom is also· an abstract character-
istic of Spirit. The latent_ abstract development of Spirit is 
regarded as necessary while 11that which exhibits itself in the 
-
conscious will of men, as their interest, belongs to the domain 
of Freedom. "2 The freedom of man does not seem to mean his 
~ 
freedom of choice but a stage of realization by the individual 
that his interests and truth lie in the universal. 
It ~s ~nteresting and important here to understand what 
is meant by saying that the individual's interests and truth 
lie in the universal. In society, each ~ndividual as a 
rational self-conscious unit pursues his own ends but at the 
same t~e these ends and individuals interrelate and come into 
conflict. When such individuals are considered to be merely 
together without a pommon_purpose or principle guiding their 
actions, their interests are individual and their freedom is 
restricted. But, on the other hand, when each individual 
reflects the totality of the social life, society and the 
individual are free and self-determined. The perso~ as an 
intelligent be~ng performs his duty "as ~ ~ and as some-
-thing which is; and in this necessity he has himself and his 
- -
actual freedom."3 In the state, the sway of particular wills 
1. Hegel; PH, 104. 
2• Ibid., 26. 
3. Hegel, PM, 253. 
such as that of' the nliberalist 11 of' the French Revolution1 
is only the formal side of Freedom. Real Freedom is only pos-
sible when the individual finds his realization in the require-
ment of reasonable Laws. 
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For Hegel, freedom and necessity are not mutually exclusive. 
In fact, freedom presupposes necessity and if you take either 
separately you have abstraction on both sides. uFreedom is 
no blank indeterminateness: essentially concrete, and Unvary-
inglyr self-determinate, i.t is so far at the same time necessary!' "2 
An example of what Hegel means.can be given in the case of a 
criminal who looks upon his punishment as a restriction of' his 
freedom. The punishment is not an external force imposed 
upon him but really a manifestation of his own act. If he 
sees this he comports himself as a free man. nin short, man 
. 
is most independent when he knows himself to be determined by 
the absolute idea tbroughout. 113 
Likewise, the freedom of choice is but an ab~tract way of 
looking at concrete freedom. Concrete freedom, however, 
includes freedom of choice while at the same time transcending 
it. When we examine free choice we see that it involves contra-
dictions. The alternatives are "g:I.venu and hence depend upon 
~ . 
outward circumstances and the freedom involved here is only 
the freedom to choose one of the given alternatives. This 
freedom is freedom in form. 
1. Gf. Hegel, PH, 452. 
2. Knox1 HPR, 71. 
3. Wallace, LOH, 283. 
The genuinely free will, which includes free 
choice as suspended, is conscious to itself that 
its content is intrinsically firm and fast, and 1 knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its own. 
Volition is a form of thinking and in so far as it is 
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thinking it is rational. Rational means for Hegel logically 
necessary according to the dialectical process. In the Philo-
sophy of Right, for example, Hegel names the constitution as 
being developed and actualized rationality and as being the 
basis of·the state. As thiS basis, the constitution determined 
the individual's attitude toward the state. It is also the 
basis of public freedom because their particular freedom becomes 
realized in a rational form. 
The constitutional laws, while in a narrow sense are 
restrictions upon the individual, are at the same time the 
means by which the individual receives protection from other 
wills. But to stop here is to misrepresent Hege1 1 s'view of 
the constitution. Law is not the mutual restraint of all against 
all but is the objectification of spirit, volition in its true 
form. "Only that will which obeys law, is free; for it obeys 
2 its elf -- it is independent and so free." In a constitution 
~ 
the laws must be reasonable and their actualization secured. 
When I, as a citizen, identify my particular end with the 
universal, I become free. Spirit, as self-consciousness, is 
free, i.e. self-sufficient, when it connects its laws with 
1. Wallace, LOH, 264. 
2. Hegel, PH, 39. 
universal reason. 
All constitutions are one-sided.unless they can 
sustain in themsel~es the principle of free subjec-
tivity and know how to correspond with a natural 
rationality.l 
The constitution of any given nation is rooted in the 
stage of development at which its self-consciousness, its view 
of its subjective freedom, has arrived. It manifests the stage 
at which the nation has arrived.2 Moreover, constitutions grow 
~ 
and mature.·· The Emperor in the Holy Roman Empire was at one 
t~e the judge and travelled the Empire on circuit. However, 
external reasons made h~ relegate his judicial power to a 
group of judges.3 For man, freedom consists in voluntarilz 
belonging to the larger social whole, the state, and being 
conscious that his will must be a will to general Freedom, 
the union of the universal and particular will, the State. 
This is the end of man's long education in history that his 
truth and essence are to be found in the ob.jective world. In 
fact, the objective, social world is nothing but man's essence 
30 
and truth and their separation and supposed independence is only 
the result of taking both too abstractly. The thorough molding 
1. Knox, HPR, 286. 
2. Constitutions are not just the creation of individuals. 
Socrates' principle of morality required time before it 
could become part and parcel of the self-consciousness 
of everyone. Likewise, a merely conceived constitution 
would not better the realization of freedom unless the 
individual took the principles of the constitution as 
his own. cr. lb~d., 287. 
3. cr. ~., 291:---
0 
0 
and interpenetration of the constitution of society by 
freedom is tta process l.dentical with history itself."1 
c. The Means of Spirit. 
Freedom is an undeveloped, potential idea which uses 
phenomena (that which presents itself to our sensuous vl.sion 
or, in this case, actual historical events} for its manifes-
tation in the History of the World. Hegel again repeats his 
insistence against taking an abstract concept as a principle 
and explanation and not applying it to concrete facts. 
uPrinciple -- Plan of Existence -- Law -- is a hidden, un-
developed essence, which ~ ~ -- however true in itself 
is not completely real.n2 Aims have a place in our subjective 
design only and have not yet emerged into existence. The 
idea of Spirit is yet something abstract. Spirit is merely 
. 
potential until it gets its actualization and realization, 
until it becomes real. "A second element must be introduced 
in order to produce actuality -- viz., actuation, realization; 
and whose motive power is the Will -- the activity of man in 
3 the widest sense.n Both are needed to:make history possible. 
ttThe first the Idea, the second the complex of human passions; 
the one the warp, the other the woaf of the vast arras-web of 
1. Hegel, PH, 18. 
2. Ibid., 22. 
3 • 'I15'ICI • 
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Un~versal History. "1 
The general aim o~ h~story is only ~plicit at ~~rst. 
The idea o~ Spir~t is yet only an unconscious instinct. The 
historical process 11"is directed to rendering this unconscious 
. 2 
impulse a conscious one • " 
11Although Freedom is pr~marily an undeveloped .idea, the 
3 
means it uses are external and phenomenal.n Hegel realizes 
here that the needs and des~res o~ men are the most e~~ective 
springs o~ actions and that human lives, including their 
geographical and temporal conditions and limitations, are 
e~ficient agents ~history. Hegel has not forgotten that 
ttto explain History is to depict the passions of ma:nk~nd, the 
genius, the act~ve powers, that play the~r part on the great 
stage. 114 These activities const~tute the means whereby the 
World-Spir~t attains its object~ Man seeks to satisfy his own 
purposes and yet is at the same time an instrument o~ a higher 
purpose. 
1. Hegel, PH, 23. Hegel means by "human pass ~ons 11 human 
act~vity resulting ~rom ~nterests. He does not restrict 
interests to a volit~onal aim. Rather, it involves the 
whole character and personality o~ man. It is not limited 
to private interests but also supplies the actuating force 
~or accomplishing deeds and interests shared in by society 
(Cf. Hegel, PH, 24). The motive ~orce is subjective; that 
which is aimed at can be public. This is important in 
Hegel's thought. The state represents the concrete union 
of the two, i.e. the idea and will. In the ideal state, 
private interests are at one with the common interests. 
2. Ibid., 2b. 
3. Ibid. , 20 • 
4. Ibid., 13. 
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In the process of the World's History itself 
• • • the abstract final aim of history is not yet 
made the distinct object of desire and interest. 
While these l~ited sentiments are still unconscious 
of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal 
principle is ~plicif in them, and is realizing 
itself through them. 
However, in history, collisions come about between the 
acknowledged duties and laws nand those contingencies which 
are adverse to thi.s fixed system. 112 New ideas and ways of 
life are created in opposition to the prevalent system of life. 
These contingencies involve a different principle from that on 
which the permanence of a state depends. These principles lie 
in the aim of individuals. 
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Such men are to be called World-Historical Individuals, 3 
e.g. Caesar, Alexander, and Napoleon. The individual will of 
man sometimes carries with it an essential phase in the develop; 
ment of the creating Spirit. These individuals are the instru-
ments and the means of Spirit. 
What they have personally gained therefore 
through the ind:i. vidual share they.. took in the 
substantial business (prepared and appointed in-
dependently of them) is a formal un:i.versality or 
subjective mental idea -- Fame, which is their 
rewara.4 ----
Such world-historical individuals who follow the:i.r private 
aims advance the historical process further than they are 
conscious of during their time. For example, Caesar's victory 
1. Hegel, PH, 25-26. 
2. Ibid.' 29. 
3. cr.-Ibid.' 29. 
4. Heger;-PM, 280~ 
over the Roman statesmen was not merely his private gain but 
11an unconscious impulse that occasioned. the accomplisblnent of 
that for which the time was ripe. 111 The Roman Republic could 
no longer exist. The individuals in the state were alienated 
£rom the state and could not find objective satisfaction. 
Public affairs according to Cicero were decided by the more 
eminent private citizens. 11 Caesar ••• did the Right; since 
. 
he furnished a mediating element, and that kind of political 
bond which men's condition requ1red. 112 After the death of 
~ 
Caesar it became evident that only a single will could guide 
the state. During the t~e in which these World-Historical 
Individuals li-ved, their deeds appeared to be only their 
interests and their worK, just as Caesar appeared only as an 
individual after power. 11It was the:i.rs to know this nascent 
-
principle; the necessary, directly sequent step in progress, 
which their world was to take; to make this their aim, and to 
expend their energy in promoting it. 113 
. 
These World-Historical Ind:i.viduals may also in their 
actions treat even sacred interests inconsiderately. 
~at the absolute aim of Spirit requires and 
accomplishes -- what Providence does -- transcend 
the obligations, and the liability to imputation 
and the ascription of good or bad motives, which 
attach to individuality in virtue of its social 
relations. 4 
1. Hegel, PH, 30. 
2. Ibid., 312. 
3. Ibid., 30. 
4. Ibid., 67. 
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However, Regel mainta~ns in the Philosophy of Right that 
h~roes only come on the scene in uncivilized·conditions. Their 
aims are right and necessary, but "once the state has been 
- 1 founded, there can no longer be any heroes." 
If we look upon the lives of such individuals we find no 
happy existence either. Some died early, like Alexander, or 
were murdered, like Caesar. History is "the slaughter-bench 
. 
at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and 
the virtue of J.ndividuals have been victimized. 112 Reason sets 
man's passions to work for it. "The Idea pays the penalty of' 
. 
determinate existence and of corruptibility, not from itself, 
but from the passions of' individuals. 113 This Hegel calls the 
"cunning of' Reason." 
. 
God lets men do as they please with their 
pa~ticular passions and interests; but the resullit 
is the accomplishment of' -- not their plans, but 
His, and these differ decidedly from the ends 
primarily sought by those whom He employs.4 
There is no doubt that Hegel is trying to justify, ~ his 
conce];)t of the "cunning of Reason, n the rise and fall of 
. 
cultures and men, and the corruptibility and evil found in 
the empirical facts ll>f history. R: G. Collingwood in a 
sympathetic, comprehensive and, unfortunately, too short 
treatment of Hegel's Philosophz ££ Historz defends Hegel in 
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1. Knox, HPR, 245. In this connection, Heftel defends Machia-
velli's work, The Prince. Machiavelli 'having the profound 
consciousness of the necessity for the for.mation of a State, 
has here exhibited the principles on which alone states could 
be founded in the circumstances of the times 11 (Hegel, PH, 403). 
2. Hegel, PH, 21. 
3. Ibid., 33. 
4. waiiace, LOH, 350. 
c 
1 
regard to Hegel's concept of the ncunning of Reason, 11 by 
. . 
asserting that the reason involved is man's reason and, as 
such, involves irrational elements within it. This we can 
agree with. The historical process is a process whereby man 
is making his world rational and gradually overcoming the 
uncontrollable elements in the world. But we might also 
emphasize that the Reason involved in history is at the same 
time Universal and Divine Reason and the individual is the 
means for something which transeends h~ but does not exclude 
h~. Divine Providence is at work in the world. 
So, then, by the individual's unhappiness, su£fering, 
and death, the World Historical process is advanced. 
The special interest of passion is thus 
inseparable from the active development of a 
general principle; for it is from the special 
and determinate and from its negation, that the 
Universal results.2 
But World-Historical individuals are by no means the 
only way in which historical transitions are effected. The 
very attempt to prevent Change sometimes effects a violent 
change. For example, before the French Revolution the grandees 
had clung to their power and their class privileges. This very 
reluctance to change gave the first impulse to discontent on 
the part of the lower classes. This oppression drove men to 
investigate "into the prevailing conditions. Then "the 
~ 
conception, the idea of Right asserted its authority all !! 
1. See Collingwood, IH, 117. 
2. Hegel, PH, 32. 
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~~ and the old f'ramework of injustice could offer no resis-
tance to its onslaught."1 These movements in individual and 
-
national life have their own significance and partial justifi-
cation. 
World-history, however, is above the point 
of' view f'rom which these things matter. Each of' 
its stages is the presence of' a necessary moment 
in the Idea of' the world mind, and that moment 
attains its absolute right in that stage.2 
~. Hegel, PH, 447. 
2. Knox, HPR1 217. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PRINCIPLE IN HISTORY 
Future generat~ons may typify the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as the age of ttprogress. 11 We say may 
. 
because their concept of progress may be quite different from 
the prevalent concept of progress as scientific, technical 
advance. It would be perhaps closer to the truth to predict 
the future's typification of our age as the age of the impor-
tance of the concept of process. The notion of 11process 11 is 
-
certainly not something new in the history of thoughp, for we 
find it in ancient thought. But it has received a new emphasis 
not only in Social Philosophy and the Philosophy of History 
but in Physics, Biology, and Psychology. Hegel and his 
process principle, the dialectic, have been most influential 
in bringing out this emphasis upon process. 
l. THE NATURE OF THE DIALECTIC 
The dialectical process is not anything new, for we find 
it in the Heraclitian contrast of opposites wherein the strife 
between opposites is the central point in the movement of the 
process. Plato also used the dialectical process, although in 
a somewhat different sense. But, in Hegelian thought, the 
dialectical process has received its most comprehensive and 
significant embod±ment. 
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For Hegel, the nature of a thing is more fully disclosed 
if we know its organ~c relationship to other th~gs or to the 
whole. A thought and its negation are related in such a way 
that we come closer to the truth if we know both. Whenever 
we start think~ng (thesis), we f~nd we have left something 
out (antithesis). Know~ng a thing just as it is and knowing 
a thing in its relations and negations is the difference 
between abstract and concrete knowledge. 
An analysis of an object consists in differentiat~ng the 
various phases of the object (i.e., negations and relations) 
as integral moments of a process. T.he dialect~cal process is 
driven by this conflict until between the thesis and anti-
thesis a synthesis is formed (aufgehoben). It is the nature 
. 
of thought and reality to go on to more inclusive wholes and 
larger explications. 11T.he motive power of the dialectic l~es 
in the relation of the abstract idea explicitly before the 
m~nd and the concrete idea ~plicitly before it in all exper-
ience and all consciousness."1 Without the idea implicitly 
before the mind, only contradiction would result. 
Reason cannot rest in contradictions and so we are 
pushed on to the synthesis. By add~g a negative we l~it 
39 
the thesis and thus determine it and turn it into the synthesis. 
s. Hook has clearly stated this pr~ciple of Negativitat: 
1. 
Eaeh term regards the relatiort as internal to 
itself and the other term as external to itself. 
An ant~nomy results wh~ch can be solved only by 
McTaggart, SHD, 8. 
0 
0 
reinterpreting the Situation and by lOOKing at both 
ternm and their relation from a point of view of a 
wider relation, and etc.l 
It has been and is being arg~ed that Hegel, in stating 
that a category conta~ns its own opposite, its own negation, 
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is denying the law of contradiction, e.g. that the category -
Being - conta~ns and generates out of itself its own opposite -
nothing, or non-being. According to the law of contradiction, 
either a thing is or it is not. This is not true in the dialectic 
for the relation between thesis and antithesis is not a formal 
relation of contradiction but of opposition and, furthermore, 
it is because of the law of contradiction that our reason com-
pels us to move from antithesis to synthesis. The relation 
between the thesis and antithesis derives its meaning and ex-
istence from the synthesis. The thesis and antithesis cannot 
stand alone. The lower categories have no independent existence 
but are abstractions from the higher and more concrete category. 
In the example given above, the category of becoming 
represents the synthesis of both being and nothing. The 
synthesis, becoming, contains within itself the opposition 
between being and nothing while at the same ~ime expressing 
their underlying unity and harmony. 
The opposites in Hegelian dialectic reta~n their opposi-
tion while, at the same time, they are identical; or, rather, 
they are identical in and through their differences. The 
opposition is just as real as the identity. The unde~standing 
1. HOOK, FHM, 67. 
c 
l' takes both as separate; reason takes both, but together. 
-J. E. McTaggart po~nts out that the dialectic should be 
looked on as a process not o£ construction but o£ reconstruc-
tion.2 The Absolute Idea is always ~plicitly present to us 
but not always explicitly present to us. We must explicitly 
unravel or reconstruct the Absolute Idea. This happens ~n 
experience as well as ~n history. 
For Hegel, ~ediate £orms o£ ex~stence are incomplete 
£or they do not permit things to be what they are capable o£ 
becom1ng. The real nature o£ a thing is ,made mani£est to us 
when we recognize that the immediate state is negated. vv.hen 
we ·become nsubjects n and strive to make our object (which is 
. ~ 
the negation) con£orm to ourselves and our potentialities, we 
realize our real natures. Thinking in the mathematical £orm 
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does not touch the concrete £act nor its inner nature or notion. 
For what is 11£eless, not being sel£-moved, 
does not bring about distinction within its essential 
nature; does not attain to essential opposition or 
unlikeness; and hence involves no transition o£ one 
opposite element into its other, no qualitative, 
immanent movement, no sel£-movement.3 
Or, again 
The abstract ;-as in the case o£ mathematics and 
the understanding_7 or unreal is not its element and 
content, but the real, what is sel£-establishing, has 
li£e within itsel£, existence in its very notion. It 
1. w. T. Stace asserts that any philosophy which reduces the 
variety o£ the world to a unity must believe in the 
identity o£ opposites (Stace, POH, 95). 
2. McTaggart, SHD, 3. 
3. Hegel, POM, 103. 
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is the process that creates its own moments in its 
course, and goes through them all; and the whole of 
this movement const~tutes its posit~ve content and 
truth.~ 
It ~s not we who frame these movements of notions. We 
only reproduce them. Their development is an objective, 
ontological development ~ which eternal Reason is realizing 
itself in man's thought. 
The d~alectieal process is this developmental process 
involving a constant change from potentiality to actuality. 
The principle of Development involves also the 
existence of a latent germ of being -- a capacity 
or potentiality striving to realize itself. This 
formal conception finds actual existence in Spirit; 
which has the History of the World for its theatre 
its possession, and the sphere of its realization.2 
The freedom of man is this unfolding of one's potentiality 
and the self-realization of Spirit. True freedom is the true 
necessity of this ~er law. 
2. THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL CHANGE 
As we look at the history of the world, the thought 
"which first pres·ents itself in this restless mutation of 
individuals and peoples, existing for a time and then van-
3 ishing - is that of change at large. 11 Hegel is cognizant of 
* 
the ruins and decay of Rome, Carthage and other civilizations 
wh~ch have presented us with a rich national life. Or, as he 
1. Hegel, POM, 105. 
2. Hegel, PH, 54. 
3. ~., 72. 
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expresses it, he is impressed by change nin its negative 
aspect.n The Orient has also given us another idea of' change: 
that of' metempsychosis wherein f'rom the ashes of' the old a new 
life is born. The changes 2n nature, too, we notice. They 
are infinite and manifold but they only present a repeating 
cycle of' changes. "In Nature there happens nothing new under 
the sun. ul 
The change that Hegel is concerned with is that.of' 
development. In opposition to natural change and change as 
found in the idea of memempsychosis, the region of' Spirit pre-
s.ents us with a real capacity f'or change "and that f'or the 
better -- an impulse of' perf'ectibility. "2 - This impulse of' 
-perf'ectibility is realized along the 11ne of' a self'-producing 
change wherein Spirit "makes itself actually what it a:lways 
was potentially. 113 But this process by Spirit, the realization 
of' its Idea in history, is mediated by consciousness and will 
(the means of' f'reedom) which are really an organic part, 
another manit'estation of, Spirit itself'. "Thus Spirit is at 
~ 
war with itself'; it has to overcome itself' as its most f'ormidable 
1. Hegel, PH, 54. 
2. Ibid., 54. 
3. IOIU., 55. Described in terms of self'-consciousness, 
development means coming to consciousness of' itself'. 
In terms of the notion, it is a process going f'rom 
the abstract to the concrete (Of'. Hegel, POM, 22-23). 
0 
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obstacle." In terms of the preceding section, viz. the nature 
of the dialectic, Spirit contains its own negation, the anti-
thesis comes out of the thesis. Hence, in speaking of the 
Spirit of. a people, Hegel states that it exists "as a genus, 
and consequently carries within it its own negation. 112 
But perhaps we can go one step further and apply the 
dialectical trial to the concepts we covered in Chapter I, 
v!z. Reason, the passions of man, and Freedom.3 In this case, 
Reason, containing potential Freedom, would form the thesis. 
The passions of man, the means of Freedom, would for.mthe anti-
thesis and the negation of Reason, i.e. particularity and 
individuality is in opposition to Universal Reason. The 
synthesis would be the concrete unity of the two wherein man 
finds his interests and desires fulfilled according to and in 
harmony with the design o£ Universal Reason, i.e. man attains 
to the realm of concrete freedom. 
In this context, man has a part to play in the history of 
the world. He must learn to will rational Freedom and trans-
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cend natural and subjective limitations. But, as stated before, 
1. Hegel, PH, 55. At this point Hegel presents what seems to be 
a contradiction. He says that Spirit's growth is not that of 
"the tranquillity of mere growth, as does that of organic life, 
but a stern reluctant working against itself." The probable 
dist~ction he means between organic growth which has been 
taken to be the essence of his developmental principle and 
Spirit's growth is that Spirit has no 11other 11 in which to 
muve. Its movement is only a self-differentiation. 
2. Ibid., 75. 
3. TEIS triadic scheme is nowhere explicitly stated in Hegel's 
works, at least in so far as this writer wasable to discover. 
However, it does represent the general scheme of Hegel's 
exposition in his introduction to the Philosophy of History. 
man is a means. ·Hegel's concept of the "cunning of Reason" 
makes this so • 
But man is not entirely or merely a means. It is true 
that when man's passions and subjective will have an ttobject 
which is the truth and essence of a reality,nl they constitute 
. 
a world-historical passion and are means for the develo~ment 
of Spirit. However, Hegel regards man as no~ a mere means in 
so far as the Divine is in man in the form of morality, eth~cs, 
and religion. In these forms man shares 1n the ideal aim 
itself. These forms of man's ex1stence ttare intimately con-
nected with Reason, and share in .its abs~lute claims. 112 
. 
Hegel's point here is that the means by which the ideal 
aim is realized has something in common with that ideal aim. 
Man is not in an external relation to this a~ and an instru-
ment which is used up; the means by which a purpose is realized 
must have something in common with that purpose. .In this con-
text, man is an end in himSelf and is responsible for the 
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depravation of morals and religion to the extent that he is v 
free, i.e. to the extent that Reason is active in him. 
This is the seal of the absolute and sublime 
destiny of man -- that he knows what is good and 
what is evil; that his Destiny is his very ability 
to will either good or evil -- In one word, that he 
is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not 
only of evil, but of good; and not only concerning 
this or that particular matter, and all that happens 
ab extra, but also the good and evil attaching to 
his indlvidual-rr6edom.3 
1. Hegel, PH, 78. 
2. Ibid., 37. 
3. I1hd., 34. 
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The ruin of religious, moral, and ethical purposes we 
observe in-history are merely the ruin of one of the forms 
of an eternal essence. The religion and morality of even a 
limited form of life, e.g. that of a shepherd wherein religion 
is only extended to the few s~ple relations of life~ has 
infinite worth. 
With the application of the dialectic principle, or, 
more specifically, the concept of negation, Hegel is trying 
to explain the decay, corruption, and f~ll of nations and peo-
ples. In this context, we are back to an attempt to justify 
the ways of God-- the Theodicaea. Freedom has to'be won and 
the winning of Freedom presents itself as a task for man. It 
is as yet only implicit. We have seen that, in the dialectical 
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process, negation is necessary for movement toward more inclusive 
syntheses which is at the same time a movement toward wholeness 
and truth. Negation, or, as ~epresented in history, the dying 
of cultures, is necessary for growth. The negation, the anti-
thesis, represents a truth of the thesis, i.e. the thesis is 
better known when the antithesis is seen.l In fact, the 
negation, or, rather, the movement to overcome the negation 
and opposition, is the motive of the process.2 The poten-
tialities of Spirit cannot be realized unless its existent form 
1. Herbert Marcuse reminds us that K. Marx sees crises as a 
necessary stage in the self-d1fferentiation of capitalism. 
Capitalism reveals its true form in its negative act of 
breakdown (Cf. Mareuse, RR, 159). . 
2. Cf. Hegel, PH, 54, the "impulse of perfectibility.n 
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is negated. Unless Reason is realized concretely, Hegel is 
saying, the opposition between 11ideal" and "real" will remain 
an opposition. 
But what, we might ask, is the criterion o~ this process? 
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What is the end and result toward which this movement proceeds? 
The criterion o~ this process would be, in Hegel's terms, 
"Spirit in its Completeness, in its essential nature, i.e. 
Freedom."l The historical phenomena, the actual events in 
. 
hi.story_, resulted ~rom this principle alone and only possess 
a sense of value when re~erred to it. All other perspectives 
as to the historical advance of one particular culture over 
another are "relative. and not absolute goals o~ attainment • 112 
Spirit is a subject which wh~n dialectically passing 
from stage to stage reconstitutes, or comes to ~uller posses-
sion of, its own nature which, in turn, constitutes its Freedom. 
This is the nature o~ sel~-conscious ~ought, and it can be said 
to be actual only in so much as it is aware that it is and to 
be potential only in so ~ar as it is limited to not seeing 
what its real nature is. What man is implicitly (being-in-
itself) must become explicit (being-for-itself), that is, must 
become an object f'or him. 11In this way it is in thought alone 
1~ Hegel, PH, 55. 
2. Ibid., 56. Hegel would perhaps look askance upon the 
criterion of' progress o~ technical produqtion so preva-
lent today. He might deem this criterion as only a 
criterion for "abstractu history and remark uporL.the 
extent man's partial and incomplete "understanding" has 
taken him. 
that thought is object; reason produces what is rational: 
reason is its own object.tt1 To become explicit makes all the 
difference; it creates new content. 11The whole variation in 
the development of the world in history is founded on this 
difference. n2 This bringing out what is implicit for Spirit 
is a process within itself and comes back to itself. Only 
thought and consciousness can do this. In the introduction 
to the History of Philosophy Hegel says, "The course of history 
does not show us the Becoming of things foreign to us, but the 
Becoming of ourselves and of our own. knowledge. 113 But the 
first stages of this becoming are no~ unreal. That which is 
only potent~al is not_ Maya but a necessary stage in the entire 
4 process. 
For Hegel, thinking is a creative activity and, for the 
exist+ng conditions of an historical phase, a destructive one. 
nspirit • • • is employed in rendering itself an object of its 
own contemplation; but it cannot develop itself objectively in 
its essential nature, except in thib.kiil.g itself. n5 For Hegel, 
1. Hegel, HP, 21. 
2. Ibid., 21. 
3. Ibid., 4. 
4. G. R. G. Mure, who presents a good compariXon between the 
thought of Aristotle and of Hegel, has this to say about 
Hegel's view of the relation between form and matter. 
"Hegel strove to unite the fully actual and the partly 
potential by bringing the lower levels of the Scala within 
the ambitus of an all-embracing correlativity of subject 
and object; to develop the distinction of potential and 
actual into that of apparent and real without giving to 
'appearance' a subjectivist meaningn (Mure, AIH, b3). 
5. Hegel, PH, 76. 
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this is virtually the same thing as say~ng that historical 
progress is impossible without thought. Thought brings out 
negations and hence development. Thought, which has as its 
nature universality, allows individuals to see and reflect 
upon their traditional mode of existence and to see the oppo-
sition between the requirements of universal thought and their 
"Belief," "Trust, 11 and "customary Morality. n They demand 
reasons thereby making their present limitations become patent 
and then seek to change the existing conditions of things to 
accord with their thought.1 
The relation of thought to change is presented by Hegel 
by means of the ancient Greek myths of Chronos and Zeus .2 If 
mere desire impels nations to activity, such activity and 
deeds pass away without leaving a trace because time soon 
overcomes the nations 1 deeds. In Hegel r s words, nThus it 
was first Ghronos --Time-- that ruled; •••• the offspring 
of that Chronos -- was devoured by it.n3 But Zeus, who 
~ 
represents the activity of thought, has devoured Chronos. 
Reason and self-consciousness (Zeus) have enabled man to see 
1. An excellent example of this i~ Socrates who taught 
that the moral man is one who not merely wills and does 
the right but who is conscious of what he is doing. Thus 
"the principle of Socrates manifests a revolutionary 
aspects ,["sicJ towards the Athenian State" which was 
only based on customary Morality. Cf. Hegel, PH, 270. 
2. cr. Ibid., 75ft. 
3. Ibid:-;-7'5. 
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the distinction between ideal and real and to bring into the 
world something durable thereby "negating" or "devouring 11 time. 
Reason has created something durable~ the State. "He f:ZeusJ 
is the Political god, who produced a moral work -- the State. nl 
Because the State is the embodiment of Reason and morality, it 
endures and thus transcends time. 
But Zeus and his race is, in turn, devoured nby the very 
~ 
power that produced them -- the principle of thought, percep-
tion, reasoning, insight derived from rational grounds, and the 
requirement of such grounds. 112 Thought is that 11universaln 
-
which preserves identity with itself and it negates itself 
thereby creating a higher form of its embodiment. The negation 
nis an activity of Thought, it is at the same time conservative 
and elevating in its opera.tion. 113 
~ 
Herbert Marcuse has rightly pointed out that Hegel has 
connected the destructive dynamics of thought with historical 
progress towards real universality in the state and in society. 
In the Logic, the notion is the unity of the universal and 
particular. Accordingly, in the Philosophy of Historz, the 
state represents the freedom of the subject in conscious union 
with the whole. 4 
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Summarily, then, Spirit in making itself objective and 
making this object the object of thought, negates the determinate 
1. Hegel, PH, 76. 
2. Ibid., 77. 
3 • Ibid., 77 • 
4. Cf. Marcuse, RR, 240f. 
0 
0 
form of its be~ng and also gains a more complete comprehension 
of the~universal element which lies in its potentiality. 
3. THE STATE 
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel does not discuss the 
State as such or its place in his system. The State is covered 
as such in the Philosophy of Right where the State represents 
the synthesis of the family and civil society.1 In the Philo-
sophy £f Historl, Hegel deals with the State only in its 
concrete forms as represented in history. However, we would 
do well to consider what pos~tion the State has in Hegelian 
thought before we consider its appearance in history. 
2 A. The State in Relation to Freedom. 
Hegel ins~sts that we need an ~nstitution which will 
preserve subjective, ~dividual wills and yet transcend their 
strife and competitive ways. We need an identity between the 
general and particular will. Only in this sense is Freedom 
realized and the State is this embodiment of concrete Freedom. 
The abstract actuality or substantiality of 
the state consists in this, that the end pursued by 
the state ~s the general interest, wh~ch, being the 
substance of all particular interests, includes the 
preservation of them also.3 
The State is Reason having become objectively present to 
the individual. The Universal is to be found in the State and 
1. Cf. Hegel, PM, 262. 
2. Cf. Chapter I, p. 26. 
3. Hegel, POR, 257. 
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its laws. The Union of the Universal and subjective will is 
truth and, indeed, Hegel says 11 the State is the Divine Idea 
~ 
as it exists on Earth." Freedom has obtained objectivity • 
. 
Hegel identifies the state with law and law is the objective 
form of Spirit. "Only that will. which obeys law, is free: 
for it obeys itself-- it is independent and so free."1 The 
State is the embod~ent of rational freedom. 
Hegel's concept of the State can be regarded as a 
"system of three Syllogisms • 11 
(1) The Individual ••• through his particularity 
or physical and mental needs {which when carried out 
to their full development give civil society), is 
coupled with the universal, i.e. with society, law, 
right, government. 
(2) The will or action of the individuals is the 
intermediating force which procures for these needs 
satisfaction in society, in law, etc., and which 
gives to society, law, etc. their fulfilment and 
actualization. 
(3) But the universal ••• is the permanent under-
lying mean in which the individuals and their satis-
faction have and receive their fulfilled reality, 
inter-mediation, and persistence.2 
All the activity of Spirit strives to become conscious of 
the union of the objective idea and the subjective will that 
wills it. In this it is conscious of its own freedom. 3 
Again, the stress should be upon the word "conscious, 11 for 
history is the progression of the consciousness of Freedom by 
Spirit. "The state works and acts in obedience to conscious 
< 
ends, known principles and laws, which are not merely implied, 
1. Hegel, PH, 39. 
2. Wallace, LOH, 340. 
3. Cf. Hegel, PH, 49. 
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but expressly before its consciousness. ul The state must not 
be dependent upon a system of' individual and contingent needs 
• 
and wants as it is in civil society. This only af'f'ords a 
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"spectacle of' excess, misery, and physical and social corrup-
tion."2 The state must be consciously willed by the individual. 
~ 
The individual should know and will the universal in the f'orm 
of' the state. The members of' the state take it "as their end 
and aim and are active in its pursuit ••• and their activity 
is consci.ously aimed at none but the universal end. 113 
B. The State as the Object of' History.4 
We have found that the consciousness of' Freedom is the 
absolute a~ of' history and that subjective will and thought, 
the passions of' men, are the means of' realizing this Fre~dom. 
We have found also that the objective ex~stence of' the union 
of' these two is the state. 
The state represents f'or Hegel the basis and center f'or 
the other elements of the life of a people. It actuates the 
life of the people who compose it. Its laws are the rights 
of' its members; the history of' the state, their deeds -- uit 
1. Hegel, POR, 258, italics mine. 
2. Ibid., 188. 
3. Knox, HPR 160-161. 
4. The word f1object" is used here in the sense that it is 
of' all the diverse aspects of history the center toward 
which the philosophical historian should turn his 
attention. 
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constitutes their existence, their being. 111 It represents 
the spirit of one people and is the actuality of the. ethical 
Idea. In Hegel's words I 
The state exists immediately in cust9m, 
mediately in individual self-consciousness, knowl-
edge, and activity, while self-consciousn~ss in 
virtue of its sent~ent towards the stateJfinds in 
the state, as its essence and the end and product 
of its activity, its substantive freedom. I 
Hegel will not have us identifying subjective lreedom with 
substantive freedom spoken of above. Let us point out 
brierly this distinction by an example. A man ~y recognize 
the dictates of his own consciousness ·and so; ib this respect, 
he is a law to himself. In this recognition mal has attained 
. I 
to abstract subjective freedom. But this same man may regard 
law as an extraneous force governing him in whi~h he regards 
I 
I 
himself as only an accident to it. This view of law would be 
J 
similar to children who obey their parents withbut insight of 
their own. But when man realizes that· this law is only the 
law of Spirit of which he is only an imperfect embod~ent, he 
I 
I 
has reached substantive freedom. He has reached the conscious-
! 
ness "that it is his .£!!!inmost- being that gove:dns hiin -- :i.e. 
1. 
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Hegel, PH, 52. Perhaps the connection betwe~n the state 
and the people in it can be more readily see l.n a passage 
in Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (p. 267). He ays the ncol-
lective spir1t 11 of a peopie"ind its actuali~~tion, a consti-
tution, are inseparable. The collective sp.Lr·i t could not 
exist without forming a constitution. The cpnstitution 
develops from the national spirit through the same grades. 
"It is the indwelling spirit and the history! of the nation 
(and, be it added, the history is only that spirit's history) 
by which constitutions have been made and arj:) being made." 
2. Knox, HPR, 155. \ 
I 
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a consciousness o~ sel~-determination or ~substantive_7 
'Freedom.' 111 The State as the highest embodiment o~ social 
morality sustains my ~reedom o~ will and compels me to rise 
above my mere personal and contingent interests. 
The Spirit o~ a people constructs itsel~ into the 
objective world and exists in the ~orm o~ the whole complex 
o~ institutions. "Nations are what their deeds are. "2 The 
.. 
nation which has itsel~ ~ully presented to itsel~ in objective 
~orm is in ~ull reality. 11The contradiction between its 
. 
potential~ subjective being -- its inner aim and l~e -- and 
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its actual being is removed. 113 Once this opposition is removed, 
the nation dies a natural death. To transcend this boredom 
and death, nations need a ttnew National Spirit. "4 
, . 
But at the same time "this Spirit o~ a People is a 
» 5 determinate and particular Spiritu and represents a ~orm 
and objecti~ication o~ Spirit.6 
1. Footnote by Sibree (ed.) in Hegel 1 PH, 104. 
2. Hegel, PH, 74. 
3. Ibid., 74. 
4. c.r:-Ibid., 75. But those nations who are i~luenced by 
Zeus, or reason, do not die this natural death; Spirit 
and Reason ~re their all-pervading principles. 
5. Ibid., 53. 
6. ~s point Hegel presents us with an analogy between 
the Spirit o~ a People and Spirit be~ore its objectiri-
cation. His analogy is drawn to the Soul in relationship 
to its ~aculties. The ~aculties in their ~orm o~ cohcen-
tration in a simple unity produce that Soul. It is 
questionable at this point whether Hegel is subscribing 
to a group-mind theory o~ culture. (Of. Ibid., 53.) 
~egel 1 s ~onc~ption of Weltgeist and VolksgeiSt points 
to a bel~ef ~n a group mind. 
0 
0 
Spirit is 
One Individuality which~ presented in its 
1essen'C'e"as God, ~s honored and enjoyed in Religion; 
which is exhibited as an object of sensuous contem-
plation in ~; ~nd is ap~rehended as an intellectual 
pon~eption in Philosophy. 
li 
The Spirit of the State and these other forms of Spirit 
:I 
form an ~nseparable bond. "Only in connection with this 
particular religion, can this particular political constitution 
II 
exist;~ 112 The same holds. true with Philosophy and Art. 
,I ~ 
~ecause Hegel sees the state as an individual totality·, 
j, 
56 
an organic whole in which the ~ife of the people is inextricably 
bound 
11
up, he chooses the state to represent historical forms. 
,, 
This is not the only reason. In the state man possesses his 
I 
I' 
spiritual reality nfor his spiritual reality consists in this, 
I 
that his own essence -- Reason -- is objectively present to him, 
~ 3 that f:t possesses objective immediate existence for him."· The 
state ';is the embodiment of rational Freedom and, as we remember, 
reason is our hypothesis in the philosophical comprehension of 
history. 
I 
'I 
The Idea of Spirit in its successive phases manifests 
!I 
itself·· in distinct political principles. The state is also 
the manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. The state 
" 
repres~nts the 11union of the objective side -- the Idea --
~ -
and the subjective side -- the personality that conceives and 
•' 
1. Hegel, PH, 5'3. 
2 • Ibid. , 53 • 
3. Ibid., 39. 
-, 
0 
0 
wills it."1 For Hegel, the state is the World:-Spirit through 
whic4 the law of history operates. nit is to the State, 
,, 
therefore, that change in the Aspect of History indissolubly 
,, 
I' 
attaches itself. 112 
I 
,But Hegel insists that the subjective side must play its 
part~, The ~orm ih which the state appears in history is depen-
I, 
dent 1upon 
II 
,, 
the S:1tate 
I 
the stage to which man has developed. The form of 
corresponds to and has its basis in the stage at 
which man has become conscious or, rather, self-conscious, of 
his o~n freedom, e.g. the German world has recognized that all 
are free and, accordingly, the ~orm o~ the state which is most 
,I 
I 
I 
adequate to express this recognition is a constitutional 
monarchy. For Hegel, the state represents the entire culture 
I 
o~ a hation and 11 the Spirit of the People itself. 113 The forms 
,, 
. 
57 
which'! the st·ate assumes correspond with the stages or historical 
i: 
perio~s in which the realization of Freedom is coming about. 
II 
But the successive forms of states are subordinate to 
II 
,[ 
a higher principle which is the World-Spirit. The World-
1 
Spiritl "constitutes itself absolute judge over states • 114 
Each nation has a history of its ovm and is assigned one 
task, one deed, in Universal History.5 Each of these "National 
I' 
Spirit;,s n forms one individual in Universal History. To realize 
,( 
II 
1. He'gel, PH, 49. 
2. I'lJd..d., 47. 
3. Ibid., 50. 
4. Hegel, POR, 248. 
5. c~:,. Hegel., PM, 275f. 
,, 
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'I 
their individual grades is the impulse of the World-Spirit. 
,: 
I, These grades are~ moreover~ preappointed in the process of 
the ~rand Vv.hole.1 The Spirit of the people itself (what we 
might call 11culture 11 ) is the substance that receives the form 
" 
of' cdncrete reality· in the form ot· the state. Spirit receives 
" 
its :d,ealization in the phenomenal form of the state. 
,, 
!1 - .. 
'lit may be quest:r..oned at th:r..s point whether the state for 
" Hegel,, is the proper object of' history. Hegel says that 11the 
conception of God ••• constitutes the general basis of a 
'I 
people's character., 112 The form of the state rests upon and 
li 
is 1ti1 organic connection with the form of religion. The 
I 
state is universal ohly in so far as :r..t is recognized as the 
pheno~enal ex:r..stence of the Divine Essence. 11 The State is the 
~ 3 Divine Idea as it exists on Earth." Religion and the State 
II 
are i~separable. Hegel says that 
I 
in the Protestant state, the constitution and the 
code • • • embody the princ~ple and the development 
9f the moral life~ which proceeds and can only pro-
ceed from the truth of religion, when reinstated :r..n 
~ts original princ~ple and in that way as such first 
becomes actual. 4 
It is modern folly "to make a revolution without having made 
a reformation. "5 
1: 
" 
1: 
1. C~:· Hegel, PH, 46. 
2. Ibid., 50. 
3 • Ibid. , 3 9 • 
4. Hegel, PM~ 290. For an extensive view of Hegel's thoughts 
o~· religion and the state, see Hegel, PM, 282ff. 
5. Ibj_d., 286. The Russian ConmJ.unists have indeed learned 
much from Hegel, but have they stood Hegel on his head 
or are they looking at the world upside down? 
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:·H. ]/Iarcuse mainta~ns that the actual relationship between 
" the realm of absolute Mind and the State underwent frequent 
I 
1 cha~es in Hegel's thought. However, Marcuse states further 
on t~at the place of the state in Hegel's actual system, i.e. 
in objective mind, points to the impossibility of regarding 
the state as the highest reality within the whole system. 2 
1: 
II 
,,In thinking, a people can raise itself into an object of 
,, 
its Qwn contemplation, it can make its world reasonable. As 
soon .:as it realil2:es the principle which it embodies, it has 
II 
atta~ned its highest point. But in the atta~nment of this 
1: 
principle its own negation, annihilation, comes about while 
I! 
at the same time bringing to the fore a new principle. But 
this '.rise and decay is only a movement within a movement. 
The principles of the successive phases of 
~pirit that animate the Nations in a necessitated 
::gradation, are themselves only steps in the develop-
1,ment of the one universal Spirit, which through them 
elevates and completes itself to a self-comprehending 
totality.3 
1This new form on the part of universal Spirit alters 
1: 
11 the substantial character of the National Spirit."4 
1. Cf. Marcuse, RR, 87. 
2. Cf. ibid., 178. In this connection, R. G. Collingwood 
points out that by gl.ving. the state the central position 
:Ln his his tory,. Hegel is inconsiStent. Hegel ought to 
liave had the historian dealing with the process of absolute 
mind not so much just object~ve mind {Cf. Collingwood, IH, 
1,131). It can be pointed out here that much of the subject 
matter dealt with l.n the Philosophz of History concerns 
i'~self with religl.on rather than the state. 
3. Regel, PH, 78. 
4. ~-,· 78. 
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4. THE NATURAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL 
FACTOR. IN RISTORY 
,, Hegel is well aware o-r the influence which nature plays 
I, 
in h~story. It is the "necessary and essential n basis on 
~ 
which the production o-£ the Spirit o-r a People depends. The 
II 
Idea of Spirit in the History o"£ the world appears in an 
•I 
actually existing people and as such falls under the influence 
I 
II • l 
o-£ nature, time, and space. 
1: 
,I 
nAs the mind of a special nation 
; 
is actual and its liberty is under natural conditions, it 
1: 
admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and 
II 
!! 2 
climatic qualities. u Nations make their appearances under 
'I 
I 
the form of nature. Hegel warns us again against being 
•I 
abst~act and not taking a concrete view of a people and state. 
The form of a constitution of a people is dependent upon the 
condition of the people, including natural conditions. The 
constitution of a people makes 
II 
:1one substance -- one spir:i.t -- with its religion, 
1'its art and philosophy, or, at least, with its 
:!conceptions and ·thoughts -- its culture generally; 
,not to expatiate upon the additional "influences, 
11ab extra, of glimate, of neighbors, of its place 
!;in the world. 
,, 
•But Hegel is not too clear as to the extent of the 
II 
nature's influence. This is shown in the safe statement he 
II 
makes when he says 11Nature should not be rated too high or 
too lbw: the mild Ionic sky certai~y contributed much to 
1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 79. 
2. Hegel, PM, 725. 
3. Hegel, PH, 46. 
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the charm of the Homeric poems, yet this alone can produce 
" 
!, 1 
no Homers • 11 
:; Hegel gives us what might be termed a more psychological 
'I 
,I 
approach to nature's ~nfluences. He speaks of natural influ-
ences on the soul and the diversity of cl~ate constituting 
I' 
the diversities of race and, even more specific, "local minds .n2 
I' Nat~e's influence however is more effective in nthe inner 
li 
tendency and capacity of the intellectual and moral character 
II 
of t:tie several peoples. 113 But 11 these points of dependence 
~ ~ 
~upQn nature_7 lose ~portance in proportion to his civili-
1: 
zation, and the more his whole frame of soul is based upon a 
,I 
substructure of mental freedom.n4 
I 
,, 
Hegel's point here can readily be seen, for example, in 
his dpproach to religion in Africa. Religion begins with 
man's consciousness that there is something higher than man. 
In sd'rcery as exhibited -in Africa, however, ma.n is shown to 
be the highest power having a position of command over Nature. 
!! 
This 1is not to say that the African is not conscious of his 
dependence upon Nature, but this dependence does not conduct 
II 
,, 
them ,:to the consciousness of a Higher Power. They are too 
ii 
absorbed with nature and the means to control it. "It is 
,, 
they who command the elements, and this they call 'magic.r"5 
1. 'I H,egel, PH, 80. 
2. Gf. Hegel, PM, 172. 
3. Ibid., 17·2. 
4. Ibid., 171-172. 
5. Hegel, PH, 94. 
0 
0 
Real reverence is only gotten by having a consciousness or 
I[ 
a Higher Power. trpor if arbitrary choice is the absolute, the 
3 -
only :isubstantial objectivity that is realized, the mind cannot 
in such be c·onscious of any Universality. ul 
rrHowever, nature is the first step by which man can gain 
I 
~ 2 freedom within himself. There are some climate zones in 
which man cannot even staJ."'t his path toward freedom -- "cold 
II 
and heat are here too powerful to allow Spirit to build up a 
I 
worlq i'or itself. 113 Man cannot turn to the general and more 
elevated because his attention is constantly turned toward 
nature. Man is too busy, as Aristotl~ said, with "pressing 
I 
needs. 11 The theatre of History is the temperate zone. 
'I 
" . 1Hegel here presents ~s with a discussion of America and 
:r 
the ~nfluences of its geography and climate. He makes some 
startl~ng analyses and also some very doubtful ones.4 Extreme 
'• 
,I 
indi~idualism is recognized by Hegel. For example, he names 
:r 
'I it as one of the causes for so many religious sects which he, 
by t:rie way, regards as 11the very acme of absurdity.u5 He 
~ 
also 'Ire cognizes that the opening frontier or early America 
d 
was one Gf the reasons why social and economic pressures were 
II 
I' alle~iated~6 He says, in summary, that America "is therefore 
r: 
I 
1. ~egel, PH, 95. 
2. 
3. 
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4. 
qt. Hegel's view of property and personalityKabove, p. 23n. 
Hegel., PH, 80. 
~or example, nThe. weakness of the ~e.:1.ean ;:-1.e ., India~ 
physique was a chJ.ef reason for bringJ.ng negroes to AmerJ.CH3." 
('Ibid., 82) • 
5. 
6. 
Of. Ibid., 85. 
This idea Hitler was to use later (Lebensraum Politik) in 
gn attempt to justify militarism and imperialism. 
I 
I' 
the lland o.f the .future, where, in the ages that lie before us, 
~ 1 
the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself." 
p 
::Hegel now gives us a triadic scheme o.f geographical 
" 
zones:. They need not concern us much except in outline and 
the 
A. 
~ssential points connected ·with the development o.f Spirit. 
'i 
II • 2 
~he Elevated Land. 
'I 
I 
::rncluded under this divl.sion are the general areas 
ll . 
I 
between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, parts o.f Africa, 
,, 
and South America. The peoples are characterized by patri-
1 ,, 
'I 
archal and nomadic life and are a careless people as to their 
IJ 
I 
own ~uture. 
B. ~he Valley Plains. 
!!Included under this division are China, India, Egypt,. 
I 
and the Tigris and Euphrates area. The .foundations o.f great 
I' 
I 
states begin here, as the land is conducive to property and 
I 
lega:t regulations • 
'I 
•I 
c. The Coast Land. 
I 
I Hegel recognizes that water, the sea, is much less a 
separating element than it is a uniting element among peoples. 
The sea has made the Mediterranean area the .focus o.f national 
life~ 
I 
!The sea expands man's horizon and gives him nthe idea o.f 
I 3 
the ~nde.finite, the unlimited, the infinite." 
1. Hegel, PH, 80. 
2. C.f. ibid., 88. 
3. Ibid:-:;--90. Hegel excludes China .from this influence on man 
by the sea and doesn't mention Japan. He also hints that 
it is the cause o.f separation o.f ·coast-lands .from the 
interior statesi naming Holland and Portugal as examples. 
Many more examp es could be given to the contrary. 
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~egel generalizes even further and gives us character-
:l.sticl3 of Africans, Asians, and Europeans. It might be added 
:I 
here ;~hat his characterizations are not in terms of "race," 
i.e •. an inherent type, pure and unpure, forever ingrained in 
a man:, but in terms of nature's effects upon a man's character. 
,, 
Let us give just one reason why Hegel's characterizations are 
what ·~hey are. Though general, he presents us with some inter-
esting thoughts. 
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I 
·[n the African, consciousness has not yet made the distinc-
,, 
tion between itself as an individual and the universality 
II 
conta~ned within its essential being.1 Their religion is· yet 
" II 
in th:e form of magic wherein they do not as yet recognize a 
high~r, moral God. They remain at the point of mere sensuous 
2 
volition. They show a want of self-control. 
3:n Asia, however, "we find ourselves for the first time 
on t~'e real theatre of History. n3 The Light of Spirit first 
I -
appe~s here. All religious and political principles have 
II 
orig~~ated here. Europe presents us with the scene of their 
I 
deve~.bpment. 
5. THE COURSE OF THE WORLD' S HISTORY 
··The course of his tory, the course of Spirit's becoming 
,, 
I, i d b • f free,1 s presente y Hegel J.n the orm of an image somewhat 
I 
1. Qf. Hegel, PH, 93. 
2. Of. Chapter II, P• 61. 
3. ~egel, PH, 99. 
I, 
0 
0 
remirliscent o:f Plato's image of the cave. The "Sun" of self-
consciousness arises in the east, Hegel says, but only as an 
" I indi~idual sun. Man, when he first sees this sun, is blinded 
II 
by it and as~onished by its brilliancy but, at the same t~e, 
the objects around him are perceived more readily and brought 
I· II to light. In this clear perception, man is brought around to 
[I 
the perception of the relation between his own inner being and 
the S1Un. Man then begins to construct a "buildingU from his 
,I 
1l 
own inner sun and deems this illher sun higher than the original 
external sun 11for now he stands in a conscious relation to his 
Spirit, and therefore a free relation. nl History presents us 
with ::the education of the na ttl.l"al will from a state in connec-
n 
,, 
tion;with nature to free conformity to a Universal principle. 
I' 
I' The conscious relation of Spirit by Spirit is 1 the aim of the 
r: 
world and the world's history presents us with the task of 
II 
"rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one, n2 while 
,I 
• r: ~ 
at t~e same time man is bringing about this realization by 
I 
,I 
recognizing that his own Freedom is to be'found in the 
Uni vJrs al will. 
In general, this process will be one from abstraction to 
I 
concretion as found in Hegel's system as a whole. The success 
65 
in which a given state integrates the individuals contained 
withfn that state determines the degree of abstraction or 1 / 
I 
concreteness. It will also be a movement toward freedom wh~le 
1. ~egel, PH, 103. 
2. ~., 56. 
! 
/ 
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at t~~ same time.being a repudiation of inadequate and abstract 
forms of freedom. The whole historical process is essentially 
dialeptical. Man. is blinded by th~ "sun'.' and as such he is 
obedi'ent to an abstract and external law. The "negation 11 of 
J, 
this is the view that external law and custom have no authority 
over the individual and that he should follow only the dictates 
I' 
of hi,f3 own conscience and reason. The ttsynthesis u is the view 
I, 
of-·adpeople that their own conscience and reason are already 
..,_ ... , 
thera in law and Reason as contained in Society and the State. 
I· 
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In te~ms of Spirit, this process is the same, o~y the different 
I 
stages present us with (1) Spirit's immersion in Nature, (2) 
II 
the advancing of Spirit's consciousness of its freedom but as 
I 
yet s'till having an incomplete separation from Nature~ and 
(3) the elevation of Spirit to its pure universal form.1 
II 
,. 
Betwe'en ( 2} and ( 3) above is the main concern of Hegel's 
historical narrative. The east, Greece, and Rome present us 
with ,.this advancement while the Germanic world under the 
II 
intlu~nce of Christianity presents Spirit's elevation. 
~efore V'!.e present a ~en~ral outline and characterization 
of th~ various phases through which Spirit attains its freedom, 
I 
let ~~ consider the period before Spirit starts its advance, 
i.e. ·:t ts immersion in Nature. 
,, 
,, 
1. Cf. Hegel, PH, 56. A comparison between Hegel's Philosophy 
of Mind with its stages of Subjective, Objective, and Abso-
IUte Mind and the Phenomenology of Mind with its stages of 
Cbnsciousness, Self-consciousness-~eason would be both 
fruitful and entailing a volume in itself. 
0 
0 
II 
A. The Ante-historical. 
" 
'I 
:
1
The philosophical consideration of the world's history 
,, 
does not begin with the mere undeveloped potentiality of 
,, 
,, 
Spir~~ but only where t1rationality begins to manifest itself 
in t:b;e actual conduct of the World's affairs. ul History 
II 
begins when man adopts universal objects such as Right and 
I, 
'I 
I 
Law and produces a reality in accordance with them -- the 
2 State.. "Consciousness alone is clearness; and is that alone 
I 
for which God (or any other existence) can be revealed. tt3 For 
Hege1·, only those people who present us with a record which is 
"inte'lligent" and "definite" can be said to have a history. 
,I ~ 
For ~egel, the philosopher should be concerned not so much with 
what ':has happened as with the narration of what has happened. 4 
An historical people must, if we are. <to consider them, 11have . 
,, 
I • 
had an aim within the domain· of' Reality, and, at the same time, 
II 
I' 
of' s-qbstantial Freedom. 115 This is, Hegel feels, when people 
have ,:formed a state. The State, inextricably bound up with 
religion and representing the Moral Vv.hole and the embodiment 
67 
of' r~ti.onal Freedom, presents itself as the center of the 
histqrical process. Accordingly and in terms of political forms 
I 
1. Hegel, PH, 56. 
2. ~his is the beginning of the consciousness of personality 
wherein 11the person performs its Cthe UniversalJ duty as 
his own and as something which is; and in this necessity 
nen.'asn .. imself' in his actual freedom 11 (Hegel, PM, 252). 
3. ~egel, PH, 59. 
4. Cf. ibid., 60. 
5. Ibid., 62. 
0 
expressing the historical stages of Spirit, the history of 
the w,prld presents us with the process of the recognition that 
one is free. This stage takes place in the east and comes 
,I 
I• 
under'' the form of' despotism. 
B. The East. 
:Under this heading are China and the Mongols with theo-
I 
crat~~ despotism as the main form of government; India with 
• I 
II 
theodr>atic aristocracy; and Persia with theocratic monarchy.1 
I 
I, 
:.The Oriental World has the Substantial as its inherent 
,I 
prind,iple. Morality is governed externally by laws. nNothing 
subj~1ctive in the shape of disposition, Conscience, formal 
Freedom, is recognized. n2 When the western world obeys a law, 
I' 
what :man is required to do is confirmed by an internal sane-
tion~ In the East, their want of subjective confirmation is 
show:i:!ng. ttWhat should be internal subjective sentiment is 
3 
made !a matter of external arrangement. 11 To Hegel, this shows 
only \hat "Spirit has not yet attained "subjectivity, it wears 
I 
the ~ppearance of spirituality still involved in the conditions 
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1. Tme bulk of Hegel's volume on the Philosophy of History is 
s
1
pent on the actual facts of history. It woU!d l;le sense-
less to try to cover every phase of his treatment of 
nistory. Modern historical research including that of 
archeological studies has presented facts which Hegel could 
~ot have possibly known. Perhaps it would be sufficient to 
~~ay that Hegel's knowledge of history is nothing less than 
~azing and that he sticks to the facts a great deal of the 
~ime. That he is able to do this and yet bring the facts 
under the comprehensive system which he has has been even 
~ore araazing. To have thought in such a comprehensive and 
~ynoptic manner is one of the things which makes the reading qf' Hegel both difficult and exciting. 
2. ~egel, PH, 111. 
3. Ibid., 112. 
-,---
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of Nature. ul Distinctions in customs and the state are only 
., 
,, 
the ~ccidents of personal power and individual personality 
I, 
loses' its rights and perishes. Spirit, as the movement toward 
absolute knowledge of itself, or substantial freedom~ has not 
yet even freed itself from natural immediacy. The East has 
not e,ven attained to subjective freedom. 
1 The glory of Oriental conception is the One 
·crndividual as that substantial being to which all 
~elongs, so that no other individual has a separate 
'existenc~, or mirrors himself in his subjective 
.freedom. 
,, 
Vv.hen 1subjective freedom does arise, however, man contemplates 
,, 
exte~nal reality in his own soul or, in other words, man is 
cogn~zant of the relation between his own inner being and the 
sun.3 
1; The drawing back from the actual world forms 
,ipso facto an antithesis, of which one side is the 
·,absolute Being -- the Divine --4the other the :thuman subject as an individual. 
,, 
.!In the East, these two are not as yet distinguished. 
Only :;one (the Despot} is subjectively free. 
1. China. 
'~In the east, subjective freedom is not known, yet history 
begins here.5 In China, the despot stands alone and no other 
II 
I 
1. ~egel, PH, 112. 
2. Ibid., 105. 
3. or;-chapter II, p. o5. 
4. Hegel, PH, 104. 
5. Of. ibid., 112. Strictly speaking, however, China and 
India lie outside the world's history. They constitute 
'~the mere presu.pposi tion of elements. n (Of. ibid., 116) • 
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indi~idual has a separate existence from the One Power. 
Individuality has not yet arisen, ttthe subjective will is 
governed by Laws as by an external force.n1 The Universal 
I, II ,., 
Will 11displays its activity immediately through the individual. 
No arltithesis between Universal will and individual will comes 
I, 
I' a about. Morality is a matter of external arrangement in China 
" 
and dot that of subjective sentiment. Spirit has not reached 
1: 
I 
subjectivity and is still under the condition of Nature~ 
China's peoples, ruled by a patriarchal type of government, 
'I 
are, 1for Hegel, like children. 
!I 
,, They are fed from central stores and not 
:regarded as self-subsistent and adults f:andJ 
;:• •• so far as ch:i.ldren are concerned, univer-
·lsality and the substance of things resides 3in ::their parents Lin this case the DespotJ. 
I, 
" 2. India. 
i 
1In India, the external condition, the civil machinery, 
I' 
1: becomes the internal one, the separation into castes according 
to natural distinct:i.ons, but they do not show the d:i.stinct 
il 
"' conce'ption Uthat the natural and the SpiritUal WOrld ShOuld be ,, 
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t' 
recognized in the subjective aspect belong:i.ng to intelligence.u4 
" 
This :,idea is only expressed in the imagination. The individual 
II 
loses' himself in this dream. Spirit is as in a dream confusing 
Unive:rsality with subjectivity, making the spiritual sensuous 
" 
" 'I 
and the sensuous spiritual. 
1. Hegel, PH, 111. 
2. Of. the family, Hegel, PM, 254. 
3. Knox, HPR, 265. 
4. ~egel, PH, 139. 
II 
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·1The Indians have not also recognized inward morality and 
I' 
freedom. The division of society into castes is only done in 
I' 
terms of birth. They cannot loo.k at an independent object and 
see ~ts connections with other objects andhence cannot attain 
IJ 
to the consciousness of their own existence, i.e. be self-
conscious.1 
There is a type of freedom exemplified by India, though. 
I, 
This is negative freedom which is the ability to give oneself 
II 
univ~~rsality, i.e. 11 to extinguish all particularity, all 
" 
dete:Cminacy. 112 This freedom is abstract and one-sided. It 
-
is held by the Hindu to be the persistence of the bare knowl-
edge :Jof one 1 s simple identity with ones elf and, Hegel goes on 
h 
to s~y, nthere is no longer any distinction between the finite 
man ~nd Brahma. In fact, in this universality every difference 
I 
has disappeared. u3 
,, 
I 
I 
·:In the Indian society subjective particularity, the 
individual, was not included in the societal organization 
,I 
as a whole and the individual is denied his rights. However, 
,, 
when ,the individual is given his rights and he is upheld by 
[i 
the objective order of society then he becomes the animated 
il 
princ,iple 0f the entire civil society. 
ti ~ 
The recognition and the right that what :r..s 
.brought about by reason of necessity in civil 
.:society and the state shall at the same time be 
;effected by the mediation of the arbitrary will 
" 1. Hegel, PH, 162. 
2. Knox, HPR, 227. 
3. Ibid., 227. 
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is the more precise definition of what is primarily 
.:meant by freedom in common parlance .1 
3. Persia. 
'I 
11 In Persia, Spirit f:Lrst frees itself from the substantial 
I 
unit'i with nature. They are 11 the first Historical People. 112 
Exte~nal natural law is recognized as something the individual 
,, 
pPsse'sses and it stands in opposition to nature. But ttthe 
repre.sentation, therefore, which Spirit makes of itself is, at 
' 
this 1,grade of progress, of a purely natural kind -- Light. n3 
II 
·! 
The universality recognized is only a natural universality and 
I 
not that of the personal soul. 
II 
'
1In Persia, Spirit has shown its existence. But the 
1 4 Pers~an could not organize an empire upon Spirit. Persia has 
to tolerate several principles because of its recognition that 
,, ' 
its principle is Universal and shines over all. Zoroaster's 
,, 
I 
"Liglit·ll is a principle which belongs to the world of conscious-
ness~ Man finally sees himself as a partaker in the Universal 
esse~ce. In India, right and duties are attached to nature 
II 
(nat~ral classes); in China, with external commands; but in 
Pers~a man attains freedom from the merely natural and attains 
,, 
a rel,ation to something spiritual. In China the totality of 
1. Knox, HPR, 133. 
2. Hegel, PH, 193. 
3. lbid., 114. 
4. cr:-ibid., 222. 
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the moral Whole excluded subjectivity and both were only 
,, 
exter'nally arranged. In India, distinctions were there but 
II 
,J • 
the p,rinciple of' separation was only natural, unspiritual. 
II 
The tinity, Abstract Good, in Persia is a principle and not 
just ian external bond. "The f'act that everyone has a share 
in tria t principle, secures him~ personal dignity. ul The 
Unit~ and Universal of' the Brahmans carried with them the 
indi~idual's negation and the destruction of' consciousness. 
73 
In Persia, man has a relation to the Universal, he is preserved 
in t~at Universal. 
' -,, 
I 
::Egypt presents the transitional stage f'rom Persia to 
I 
,I Greece. Egypt combines the natural elements f'rom the Syrians 
and Babylonians with the spiritual element among the Phoenicians 
I 
and J;ews. Egypt 1 s symbol is the Sphinx, a half'-man (Spirit) 
I' • 
and 4alf'-ani.mal (nature) which symbolizes Spirit's rise f'rom 
'I 
I 
nat~e. In Egypt this was a riddle. It took a Greek to solve 
it. 
c. (treece.2 
,I 
1The east is the childhood of' History, trusti~g and in 
repo~~e. Greece presents us with the ~oy~ood of' history, 
" boisterous and turbulent, showing us individualities forming 
'I . 
the~elves. In Asia, morality is imposed f'rom the outside. 
In Greece, uthe Union of' the Moral withf·the Subjec.tive Will n 
,, 
1. Hegel, PH, 175. 
2. The History of' Greece is further divided into (1) the 
maturity of' Spirit, (2) Spirit's manif'estation into the 
world of' Art and Politics, and (3) the decline of' Spirit 
~f' Greece (Cf'. Hegel, PH, 250). 
0 
takes place. Nature bears the stamp of the spiritual in 
Gree~ art. This is only immediate unity, however, and their 
subjectivity is not as yet free. 
" 
'I 
:;It was with the Greeks that the principle of individuality 
,, 1 
arose. However, this principle of the Greeks is only the 
begi~ing of the development of subjective freedom. It is 
I' 
interesting and ~~portant here to see Hegel's point for the 
person's right of subjective freedom ttis the pivot and centre 
of the difference between antiquity a.,r;,d modern times. n2 
I 
''T. M. Knox points out what Hegel means by subjective 
freedom. 
He does not mean the satisfaction of desire 
or impulse in itself. He means freedom to find 
"satisfaction of the whole self, i.e. of rational-
,,ized desires •••• CHegel 7 held that subJective 
,~freedom never came w~thin tlle Greek purview at all, 
1 since the principle of conscience, of self-certainty, 
;·on which 'subjective freedomt in all its forms 
,·depends, c~e into the world with the Christian 
11 revelation. 
I' 
:
1When man makes a dec is ion, an 11I will 11 must be given 
" I ~ by m~n himself. Even though a democratic constitution was 
prescint in Athens, the final decisions were made from exter-
' 
,, 
nal ~bservations such as oracles and the flight of birds. 
Man still lacked the strength to look within himself for the 
final word. 4 
I 
. 
1. Hegel points out in this connection that the principle 
qf individuality first appeared Under its philosophic 
~hape in the Monadology of Leibnitz (Of. Wallace, LOH, 
275). 
2. Knox, HPR, 84. 
3. Ibid.' 339. 
4. Of. ibid., 184 and 288. 
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" II 
I, 
I 
II Subjective ~reedom was not reached by the Greeks. Even 
·! 
the Greek Gods were subject to an impersonal and blind destiny. 
:; 
In r~1lation to this destiny, :man's freedom is nullified. 
I' Howe~er, in Christianity u~ particular personality is recog-
" 
?5 
nized not merely as something to be solely and simply nullified, 
1 but at the same time something to be preserved." Hegel cannot 
" 
forget the attitude which the Greeks held toward the barbarians 
!' 
and slaves. "Man as man was :not then recognized to be of 
infinite worth and to have infinite rights .. 112 
I 
I 
::But the morality present in Greece is not impressed upon 
the individual as in the Orient. The substantial and the 
II 
indi~idual are not in complete separation but in immediate 
unitf and hence abstract unity. Hence it is not true morality 
I 
I because 11it is not yet purified to the standard or the free 
'I 
J 3 
subje:ctivity that is the essence of true morality." The 
individual is not completely fused with the Universal in a 
I 
conc~ete unity. We reach this stage only in a constitutional 
:I 
monanchy. 
I 
.1The Greek Spil"'it was attain~ng to freedom, but still it was 
I' some~hat cond~tioned by external nature. It is 
1. 
2. 
3. 
I• 
:!the medium between the loss of indivl.duality on 
1:the part of man (such as we observe in the Asiatic 
[
1prl.nciple, in which the Spiritual and Divine exists 
,
1
only under a Natural form), and Infinite Subjectivity 
11as pure certainty of itself -- the position that the 
'lEgo is the g'Pound of all that can lay claim to 
I, 
I Wallace, LOH, 270. 
Ibid., 293. 
Hegel, PH, 107. 
0 
0 
1subs tanti.al existence. The Greek Spirit as the 
medium between these two, begins with Nature, but 
11transf'orms it into a mere objective form of' its 
1: (S pi1.,i t 1 s ) own existence ; S pir i tuali ty is there-
::fore not yet absolutely free; not yet absflutely 
,tself'-produced -- is not self'-stifuulation. 
II 
'!The abstract and universal is overcome by the Greek. 
" jl He t~1ansf'orms nature into an objective form of' his own exist-
ence .1~ut this stimulated still by nature. 2 The Greek Spirit 
li 
,, 
is tlie plastic artist who transforms materials (nature) into 
•I 
the e'mbodiment of man's own spirit. Their idea of' the state 
'/ 
was ~bstract in the sense that the state was created only in 
the ~~pirit of a definite form of social life. 
iiin Greece we have the f'reedom of' the Individual but not 
i 
yet advanced to the recognition of his dependence upon the 
" 
generial principle -- the state.3 The individual will embodies 
76 
this ,principle, the political bond, but only in connection vrith 
his particular idiosyncracy. The general interest is considered 
'I 
11only as Custom, in the form of Objective Will, so that morality 
I 
I' prop~:rty so called -- subjective conviction and intention -- has 
I 4 
not yet manifested itself'. rr 
,:Laws were obeyed because they were laws and the interests 
of the community are still intrusted. to the will of the 
" 
citizen. nThe Democratic constitution is here the only 
possible one: the citizens are still unconscious of particular 
'I 1. Hegel, PH, 238. 
2. cr. ibid., 238. 
3. Cf. ibid., 2ID. 
4. ~bid:-;---2'51. 
c 
I' 
i 1 interests." In Democracy, Hegel says, it is all very well to 
I 
put ~ question to the vote but the essential question is the 
character of the voters. 
,, 
I 
''In a democracy, the general interest is the main concern 
but the general interest is only so as Custom. Morality, 
I, 
subjJctive conviction, has not yet manifested itself.2 The 
,, 
law in the Greek democracy rests upon an objective morality 
II 
and the choice of one law or the other rests upon custom. The 
II 
people's will has no ulterior sanction. But subjective free-
dom ~nd with it the rise of critical thinking reflect upon the 
custqmary morality and question the character of the customary 
morality and also its basis and justification. 
1 Socrates undertook to teach them what moral 
;:virtues, duties, etc. were. The moral man is not 
:1he who merely wills and does that which is right --
::not the merely innocent man -- but3he who has the 
,, consciousness of what he is doing • 
• 
1
:Democracy was possible ·in Greece because the subjective 
Free4om had not been developed. Vv.hen it was developed it 
'I 
came ''as a destructive element in Greece "for the polity which 
. 
that ·1world embodied was not calculated for this side of 
II 
I 
humanity. tt4 
:I 
11It is Socrates who introduced5 this ·destructive element 
'i 
1. ~egel, PH, 252, italics mine. Cf. also the treatment of 
·this transition in Marcuse, RR,. 242ff. 
2. Qf • Ibid., 251 • 
3. :J:bid~69. 
4. Ibid., 253. 
5. ~egel names the Sophist, however, as the first to introduce 
subjective reflection. Cf. ~., 253. 
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and it was Socrates who showed us that nspirit had acquired 
" ~ - 1 the propensity to gain satisfaction for itself -- to reflect.u 
ll 
It has been the work of thought and reflection which has 
brou~ht about this destructive element for the Greeks. A 
Democratic state is inadequate for the preservation and realiza-
tion t:of the conscious individual. 
D. Rome. 
I 
'lin the Roman realm the differentiation between abstract 
•' 
'I 
individuality and abstract universality2 is carried to its 
conc~:usion. 11Ethica1 life is sundered without end into the 
I 
'I extremes of the private self-consciousness of persons on the 
ohe :tiand, and abstract universality on the other.n3 The 
~ 
aristocracy of Rome grew into a self-see~ing power while the 
l1 
demoC:ratic element of free personality became more corrupt. 4 
;:rn the Roman state, the Social aim absorbs all individual 
I, 
aimS and presents us with the severe labors of the manhood of 
histq:ry. In Greece, individuality was rated high. In Rome, 
' 
1. ~egel, PH 270. 
2. nAbstractfr because the Universal, the form of the state, 
does not conta2n and preserve the individual. Aristocracy 
b
1
y its very nature is constantly on the verge of lapsing 
:ll'nto either tyranny or anarchy because of the divorce 
Q
1
e·tween public authority and private interests (Knox, HPR, 
l78). T. M. Knox points out that Hegel assumes that this 
danger was due to the nature of aristocracy itself rather 
~han the inability of the particular ~orm of Roman aris-
~:oc~at_j;c government to adopt itself to the rule of an 
~~pire (Of •. Knox, HPR, 368). 
3 • I:bid. , 221 • _ 
4. Of. the end of the Roman Republic from the t~e of Gracchi 
tlo the time of Augustus. 
II 
I, 
'I 
the Universal subjugates the individual but at the same time 
the ~ndividuals become persons. 
The Universal subjugates the ·individuals; they 
rhave merged their own interests in it; but in return 
·the abstraction which tpey themselves embody -i that 
is to say, their personality -- is recognized. 
:Personality is recognized with definite rights. This is 
·I 
not V,oluntary on the part of persons and an antithesis results 
betwEien the Universal and the subjective. The element of 
!I 
subjectivity which was not found in Greece is found among the 
Romans with their recognition of' personality in relationship 
to pr.,operty.2 The recognitions of' personality by the Roman 
is o~ly the recognition of' a formal and abstract type of 
,I 
persqnality. It comes to a recognition of my proper~y being 
I 
mine ''and goes no further. nindividuals are thereby posited 
II 
as atoms; but they are at the same time subject to the severe 
I 
rule of the One. "3 Private Right is· thus nullified. Each 
person is entitled only to possession while the Person of' 
Persons lays claim to the possession of all the individuals. 
This contradiction afflicted the Roman world and made the 
'I 4 Roman wretched. 
Before we proceed, let ~ sum up briefly the course of' 
,, 
history thus far. Hegel calls the Roman State the severe 
1. Hegel, PH, 107. 
2. Of. ibid., 320. 
3. Ibid:-;---320. Of'. Knox, RPR, 37. 
4. ~t is interesting here to note also that in property a 
person exists for the first time as reason but the free-
dom gained by it is f'alse.:cy- ga:l.ned because it is realized 
~nan external thing (Of. Knox, HPR, 236). 
il 
,J 
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labo~s of Manhood and then goes on to say 
!Jfor true manhood acts neither in accordance with 
1
,the caprice of a despot Cth~ EastJ, nor in 
,,obedience to a graceful capr:t.ce of its own /:JJreece_7,.; 
~ut works for a general aim ~Abstract Universality:!, 
:1one in which the individual perishes and realizes hJ.s 
::own private objecf !:Abstract IndividualityJ only in 
:!that general aim. 
I' 
::The human will is only emancipated abstractly thus far. 
"Up ~,o this p.oint, finite Freedom has been only annulled, to 
,, . 
make ;:way for infinite Freedom. 112 The Customary Morality we 
I 
foun4 among the Greeks is now replaced by the Christian 
II 
prin¢iple of man's absolute Freedom in God. Man as man has 
infirlite value. Man's freedom is no longer conditional and ,, 
i' 
no .longer dependent upon Oracles and Slaves. nMan now for.ms 
his own determinations and recognizes himself as pleni-
pote~~iary in regard to all finite existence • 113 
,1The Roman world with its emphasis upon Universality 
I 
resul:ts in despotism or tyranny and so man is driven back 
I 
into himself wherein he r_ecognizes the 11Empire of Spirit u in 
the ~ull sense of ChriStianity. The antithesis Rome presents 
'I 
I 
us with is that between the state's aims, absolute power, and 
I 
abstr'act personality.4 Individuality soon begins to wane and 
I 
:1 
so a despot is created to control the State and people thereby 
drivi~g individuals back into themselves. 
" 
1. Hegel, PH, 107. 
2. Ibid., 333. 
3. I'5'I"d., 334. 
4. ur-course, all through Hegel's history there are smaller 
transitions within the history of one civilization. For 
example, Hegel treats Roman history in three periods, 
~onarchy, republic, and empire (Cf. ~., 283). 
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~~ According to Christianity, the individual ~ 
1:such has an infinite value as the object and aini 
''ora:ivine love, destined as mind to live i.n absolute 
':relationship with God himself, and have God's mind 
;:dwelling J..n him:1 i.e •. man is implicitly destined to 
.:supreme freedom. 
'I 
,,In the Christian religion, Truth and Freedom in God are 
presented to the conceptive faculty. The state is governed 
by that same Reason but it is a 
II 
temple of Human Freedom concerned with the perception 
·,and volition of a reality, whose purport may itself 
.be called divin@ ••• the process displayed in His-
tory is only the manifestation of Religion as Human 
,:Reason -- the production o.f the religious principle 
which dwells in the heart o.f man, under the form of 
:!Secular Freedom.2 
Only when this is produced is the discord between the inner 
I 
'I life ,~o.f the heart; and the actual world removed. To realize 
this synthesis is the task of the German people. 
I 
E. ~he German World. 
'I 
~~In Christianity, the essence of man is seen to be 
jl 
spirit, but not as yet spirit objectified. This presents 
" the ~ourth phase of world history and is called by Hegel 
the 'r;Old Age." Spengler to the contrary, Hegel does not; 
< 
mean iJby 11 0ld Age 11 an age of decay and weakness. This is 
I 
-
only,true o.f nature. 11That o.f Spirit Cold ageJ is its 
II 
'I perf~ct maturity and strength, in which it returns to unity 
II 
with 'iitsel.f, but in its .fully developed character as Spirit. n3 
1. Hegel, PM, 239. 
2. ~egel, PH, 335. 
3. ~bid., 109. 
I' 
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II 
.:Hegel divides this period :into three stages. Until the 
I, 
'I 
time .1of Charlemagne, the Christian world presents itself as 
11 Christendom11 in which the Spiritual and the Secular present 
II 
I 
themselves as only different aspects. 
,, 
" I 
"Until the first half of the sixteenth century, which forms 
" 
our second stage, this antithesis between the Spiritual and 
,, 
II 
Secular develops the opposition. The church develops into a 
Theo~racy and the state develops into a Feudal Monarchy. 
'I 
Three ~eactions took place: {1) part~cular nationalities 
,, 
. 
against the universal sovereignty of the Frank Empire; (2) 
the individual against legal authority and executive power 
I, 
resulting in the Feudal system of protection; and (3) a 
ll 
II 
reaction against secular extravagances by the church (e.g. 
I' 
>i Gregory VII's enforced celibacy of the clergy). 
::Dur:ing this mediaeval period, contradictions are patent 
in bdth Church and State. On the one hand the church (or 
religious feeling) has noth:ing to do with the secular. The 
•I 
church "may make its appearance in that sphere on a mission 
II 
~ 
of mercy, but this stops short of a strict socially ethical 
82 
conne'ction with it -- does not come up to the idea of Freedom. nl 
I, 
The church is no longer a spiritual power but an ecclesiastical 
i! 
one. 
11 
On the other hand, the state is caught in contradiction. 
I 
The E~peror has an empty title and holds no solid authority 
and ~p.e individuals in the state, though pious, show "a bar-
1 
I, 
1. Hegel, PH, 380. 
0 
0 
' 1 barous deficiency in point of intelligence and will.n 
:1 -
'I The third stage begins where the second ends, viz. the 
first half of' the sixteenth century. Secularity is developed 
" 
until it recognizes its own value and worth. Dur~ng this time 
also 1. the Christian principle attains truth and reality in the 
I, 
I 
Ref'o~mat:l.on. The secular in its interest in the sensuous as 
exemplified ih the revival of' learning and the ~lourishing of' 
I 
the f'ine ar.ts no longer feels compunction in being separated 
f'rom'l the church. The church had become corrupt and turned 
~ 2 
toward the external sensuous world. In Luther's teachings, 
Christian Freedom is actualized. 
In the Lutheran Church the subjective feeling 
,! and the conviction of the individual is regarded as 
;;equally neces~ary with the objecti:re side of' truth 
, .••• the subJect himself' must be J.mbued with truth, 
:j surrendering his particular being in exchange f'or 
the substantial truth, and making that truth his own. 
'1 If' Subjectivity be placed in feeling only, without 
~that objective side, we have the stand-point of' the 
~!merely Natural Will.3 
I! 
:!Man is now in full recognition that the objective process, 
I, 
,, 
the t~secular 11 
II 
world, is the existence and definite manifes-
H 
tati0n of the Divine Essence. The harmony of Objective and 
Subj~ctive Will 
jwhich has resulted from the painful struggles of 
History, involves the recognition of' the Secular 
~~as capable of' being an embodiment of' Truth ••• 
;; that Morality and Justice in the State are also 
:idivine and commanded by God, and that in point of' 
,1substance there is nothing higher •••• Obedience 
1. ~egel, PH, 382. 
2. E.g. good works are thought of as the performance of 
ceremonies. 
3. Hegel, PH, 416. 
,, 
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[, 
II 
!lto the laws of the State, as the Rational element 
.~in volition an~ action, was made the principle of 
'!human conduct. 
I 
:~ut as yet, Hegel warhs us, the harmony between the State 
and the Church is only an immediate and abstract harmony. "It 
was not yet expanded into a system by which the moral world 
'I 
coulcL be regulated. n2 
1, 
~ -~his development is the second stage of the Reformation. 
,, 
The P~otestant Church increases and stabilizes its political 
exist,ehce into a monarchy like that of Frederick II. 
~hought, 11 the ~plus ultra of Inwardness, of Subjective-
ness,:1113 is the -stage Spirit reached at the time of the French 
'I 
Revol:p.tion. 11Spiri t perceives that Nature -- the World -- must 
d • 
also be an embodiment of Reason, :for God created it on prin-
,, 
ciple~ of Reason. 114 Experimental science was discovering 
84 
Laws 'bf the Universe, which is to say the Reason of the Universe. 
I 
An initellectual principle is discovered to serve as a basis :for 
'I 
I, 
the spate. But purely abstract principles, e.g. 11Virtue 11 based 
·~ !I 
only .Pn man's dispositions, are set up by Robespierre. nLiber-
' alism,:u as an abstract, atomistic principle which asserts the 
:.oi,·:f sway individual wills receives sanction. Hegel insists 
that the contingent will must be subjugated by a monarchical 
I 
form o:f government. The individual's freedom must not be 
lo 
II 
merely asserted, however, as it was in the French Revolution. 
t! 
1. H~gel, PH, 422-423. 
2 • Ibid. , 424. 
3. Ibid., 439. 
4. Ibid., 439. 
0 
0 
I 
I 
II 
The union of individuals must not be based upon the arbitrary 
wi.lls,, of the individuals. 
II 
,I The will.of the Many expels the Ministry from 
power, and those who had formed the Opposition !21~ 
1!the vacant places; but the latter having now become 
the Government, meet wit£ hostility from the Many, 
1
'and share the same fate. 
'I 
I, 
•In a hereditary monarchy, the individual is organically 
connected with the State, the Whole, which at the same time 
I I! 
pres·erves his essence. 11The monarchical constitution is ••• 
the c9nstitution of developed reason: all other const:Ltutions 
belong to lower grades of the development and realization of 
,, 2 
reason." 
I 
! 
Reason recei.ved its embodiment :Ln the world. Man1 s 
I 
II 
oblig~tion to the substantive, rational laws of the State 
are at the same time a realization of his particular freedom. 
The ~ion of the subjective will and the objective order is 
II 
the actualization of freedom and the state itself is this 
union,' this ethical whole. 
,1 The state is the actuality of concrete 
~~eedom. But concrete freedom cons:Lsts in t~s, 
that personal individuality and its particular 
i~terests not only • • • gain explicit recognition 
f~r the~ result, ••• but ••• they also pass 
o';ver of thei.r own accord :Lnto the interests of the 
universal; they even recognize it as their own 
substantive mind; they take it as thei.r end and 
a,l.m and are active :Ln its pursuit.3 
1. Hegel, PH, 452. 
2. Hegel, PM, 269. 
3. Knqx, HPR, 160. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANTITHESES 
1. COHERENCE 
The first and second chapters of this thesis have been 
,, 
:I 
an attempt to state the principles involved in Hegel's 
Philosophy of History and also their concrete application. 
il The p~esent chapter presents a critique, a pointing out of 
I 
II 
problems, and also a defense of some of the more moot points 
' II 
I 
I 
entai~ed in Hegel's Philosophy££ History • 
. , 
We have seen during the discussion the necessity for 
under~1tand.ing just what 
jl 
,, 
Phil os1:ophy !:?.f. History. 
I 
Hegel has set himself to do in his 
The role and function of the philo-
sophic1al historian is to think systematically about history. 
In thi~ sense, philosophical history is speculative history, 
I 
I 
and is,, done from an armchair. Hegel is only incidentally 
interested in the historian's methods for fact gathering. 
\I 
For th~ philosophically minded historian, the historical 
:I 
facts have already been established. The philosophical his-
torian'!has only to give them fuller meaning and significance 
!I 
by placing them under or in relation to the whole plan or 
aim of ,.universal His tory. This. procedure compares favorably 
:I 
'I 
to the ;methods of crime detection. The detective who also 
has at ·his disposal the unconnected facts is to re-construct 
'I 
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I 
the crime wherein all the facts will 11fit into" or cohere 
,, 
with~is conceived hypothesis. But just as in the Hegelian 
mode 11 of thought~ so for the detective all the facts· must 
. ' . 
:I 
coheir wi~h all the other facts as well as with the whole. 
For Jegel~ seeing the place of the fact in relation to all 
I 
the other facts and the whol~ is seei~g the fact's significance. 
•' This coherence theory He~el applies to the philosophical 
comprl:~hension of_ histo~. 
:I 
~he w~ole from which.~ege~ is work~ng is an organic whole. 
The p·arts which need explaining and need to be given signifi-
. .. ~ . .. ' . 
cance:: are in H~e?el_'s .!iew not on~1 organical~y connected with 
I 
the w~ole but a~e als?. t~~e?~?gical~y ~onn~cted wit~ it. If~ 
li Hegel'! is saying~ we can comprehend as a whole a certain period 
1 4 - ... ... .. 
in hi~tory~ the spir~~ o~_th~- t~es~ w~ th~ow light upon and 
give ~ea.t?-in~ to ~~~ ~art_~cul_a~. _eve?-t~ !lithin th~t pe:rio~. 
Moreover~ even gr~~ter il~uminati?~ will come to those who 
can know the purpose behind the movement of the civilization. 
'I • • - , 
But as we know~ :ae.~el ?-?es. not stop with th~ _hi_~~ory of civi-
lizations. He raises and applies what we have said above to 
II 
an ev~~ higher ~!.~?-th~~-~s. If w~. can gain a comprehension of 
II 
Unive:r\sal History~ i_.e. the __ ent_ire cours~ of world history~ 
we ca~ explain the particular national histories contained 
withirl it. 
if 
I 
I' 
In considering Hegel's ~se of coherence as a principle II . # ... .. ... 
I' 
of his·~orical interpretation~ however~ let us point out 
I~ ~ ,_ "t .,. "' _.,'" .. ( 
several que~tio~s. w~ich arise. If the _interpr~ta?ion 
of historical data is in terms of coherence~ how are we to 
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comp~ehend the whole, i.e. universal history, when history 
II 
'I 
II I hasn'::t even completed itself yet and, consequently, we 
1: 
,I 
cann~t know the whole? This brings to the fore several 
:l 
probl'ems which have presented themselves during this study 
of H~'gel's Philosophy of History. 
I, 
:'One of the problems is the difficulty in establis):ling 
I, 
HegeJJir s position as to the end of history. This has direct 
beari,.p.g on his coherence theory. R. G. Collingwood tries 
'I 
to heap us on this problem by stating that Hegel believed 
history must end with the present simply because nothing else 
has h~ppened. To the historian the future must remain closed.1 
I' 
I , 
In terms of a coherent theory of the course of history, then, 
<I 
.\ 
the best possible solution would be to obtain the most synoptic 
I 
and ihclusive viewpoint ~rom which to view and interpret the 
facts., or parts. This is perhaps why Hegel insists upon the 
princ~ple of Reason as a hypothesis and only a hypothesis in· 
,, 
1: 
the realm of history. In the realm of history, our hypotheses 
' 
II 
must be open-ended, i.e. subject to revision, because of the 
,, 
incomplete nature of history itself. The question is now to 
be asKed in this manner: Is Hegel's hypothesis open-ended 
I' 
,I 
and subject to revision? 
I' 
I 
R. Flint says of Hegel 1 s Philosophy of History: "To 
const~ue and formulate history as if it were complete was a 
1
1 • 2 
very ser~ous step." In defense of Hegel we can say nothing 
•I ), 
1. ci'. Collingwood, IH, 120. 
2. Fl~nt, PRE, 534. 
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except that a hypothesis as to tpe overall plan of history 
cannot be based on anything but the past. We certainly cannot 
have 'lit based on the future which is not known as yet. Hegel 
I' 
himself says that the inference from history that history is 
I; 
a rat!ional process must present itself 11as the ultimate result-
'1 
of Hf~ tory. 111 
~arcuse is correct in pointing out2 that Hegel says 
,, 
afteri1 the description of the Restoration, 11This is the point 
whic~! consciousness has attained. 113 
I' 
. 
The development of the 
I Idea 9f Freedom, the realization of Spirit, has been realized. 
,, 
Spirit itself is eternal and the present form of Spirit 
~omprehends within it all earlier steps. These 
have indeed unfolded themselves in succession 
~ndependently; but what Spirit is it has always 
been essentially; distinctions are on~y the 
development of this essential nature.· 
What the specific course of the World's history will be is 
:1 
not the task of the philosophical historian, but from the 
,, 
,, 
I 
study ;;or the past we can see that rrwhat has happened, and 
,, -
is ha~pening every day, is not only not 'without God,' but 
j 5 
is ess'entially His Work. II 
The eternal nature of Spirit presents a problem which 
carrie~ us into the realm of metaphysics. Carried to this 
1: 
plane,~: the question involves the question of the place of 
II 
1. cr::. Hegel, PH, 10. 
2. Marcuse, RR, 227. 
3. Hegel, PH, 4bo. 
4. Ibid., 79. Cf. also Hegel, POM, 808. 
5. Hegel, PH, 457. 
I 
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time in Hegel's system. Withouy getting into a lengthy 
,, 
,, 
discussion concerning Hegel's actual position in regard 
'I 
to ti~e, let us point out the problem. We know that, for 
II 
h 1 Hegel', history is the development of Spirit in time, yet, 
I, 
on the other hand, we also learn that 11 the element of Spirit 
is Et·~rnity. Duration, properly speaking, cannot be said to 
belong to it. tt2 Does Hegel provide us with a reconciliation? 
II -If history is merely phenomenal, a mode of externalization of 
,, 
" Spiri~, how can it be said that Spirit, which is eternal, 
prese~ts us with a development in time? This is not to say 
I, 
that ~egel regard~ time as being more fundamental than 
I' 
Spirit, but the Eternal Idea and Spirit are working them-
!! ~ 3 selves out in time. If the Idea is process, what can a 
I' 
process mean that has no dura tio:n, no "before 11 and 11a:f'ter?" 
I 
II 
We can merely point out this apparent difficulty as the 
I. 
li 
arguments on either side would involve a volume in themselves. 
2. A PRIORISM 
4 Hegel is often accused of a priorism. J. B. Bury says 
II 
of Hegelts Philosoph!~ History: 
I 
Hegel's PhiloSOPhy of History is better known 
I, 
II 
1. 0~1 • Hege.L, PH, 7(!,. 
2. Ibid.., 110. 
3. ~allace, LOH, 356. 
4. B~' a priorism we mea:n the deduct~on of historical facts 
fr;?iii presuppositions regarding its aim and end so as to 
mi,;:Jrepresent the empirical facts of history (Cf. Hegel, 
PM, 276). 
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11
than Fichte 1 s. Li.K:e F~chte, he deduced the D.is-
1.torica1J phases !! pr~or~ from his metaphys:i.cal 
tpr:i.nc:i.ple, but he condescended to rev:i.ew in some 
ildetail the actual phenomena.l 
1: 
'[Likewise, M. R. Cohen ma..kes the assertion that Hegel 
deduced ~ priori the facts of history from philosophic 
principles .2 The quest:i.on we ask here: Is this criticism 
just~fied? The answer would seem to be: Not entirely. 
II 
I 
,~In his treatment of history, Hegel insists upon an 
empi:J·ical approach. 11We must proceed historically -- em-
piric:ally. n3 The idea that man was free by nature and that 
It 
civil1d.zati;n has hindered his freedom Hegel rejects on 
'I empir~cal grounds. He is quite emphatic about it. 
'I 
' That assumption ~that man is free by nature 7 
is one of ~hose nebulous images which theory pro--
~uces; an idea which it cannot avoid originating, 
but which it fathers upon real exist~nce, without ~ufficient historical justification. 
II 
t! Hegel likewise rejects the idea of a pr~itive para-
I disiacal condition of man because of its lack of basis in 
' 
empirical fact. 5 He is well aware of experience and its 
'I 
importance in knowledge but he was also aware of going ~o 
li 
I 
extremes in this insistence upon being empirical. Hegel 
1: 
striv~s to walk the middle path between the fallacy and 
impos~ibility of being completely empir:i.cal and impartial; 
i.e. t~e reading of history as a series of unrelated instances, 
,, 
I• 
1. Btiry, IP, 2o4. 
2. Cf:l. Cohen, MHH, 88. 
I 
3. He'gel, PH, 10. 
4. Ibid., 40. 
5. ~~-, 57. 
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and the other extreme of imposing concepts upon historical 
fact~'. Of the former extreme of alleged impartiality, Hegel 
'I 
maintains that a historian without some aim, some view by 
I 
whicli the important facts can be sorted ou~, would be 
I 
" I 
··only an imbecile mental divagation, not as good 
'as a fairy tale, for even children expect a motif 
itin their stories, a purpose at least dimly surmise-
.:able w:ith1 which events and actions are put into relation .. 
11 
.;In considering the other extreme, viz. the imposition of 
concepts upon historical data, Hegel tries to avoid this 
I 
Hegel like·ns his procedure as being ~ priori extre;me also. 
:I 
only in the sense ~ which Kepler was ~ priori. Kep~~r,_ in 
order·· to understand and discover his laws, was familiar a 
,, -
priori with ell"ipses, cubes, etc. He was familiar with 11a 
" ., 
wholet, circle of conceptions to which the principles in 
f! ,. .. 
' 2 
question belonged. n In history~ Hegel asserts, to know 
I 
;I 
that a certain quality characterizes the peculiar genius of 
'i 
a people must be established empirically. But we must first 
,, 
,, 
be fandliar with these characterizations in order to look 
I· 
II 
for! them in the empirical data. These concepts Hegel gets 
•' from philosophy and he claims that this basic concept or 
II 
category has been proven in that field -- Reason. 
" II 
~t this point J. B. Bury and M. R. Cohen might interpret 
I· 
·· by saying that this is .! priorism. If the speculative philo-
! 
92 
sopher. can detect Reason at work why cannot the non-philosophical 
II 
1. H€!'gel, PM; 277. 
2. He:gel, PH, 64. 
I 
historian? I~ you reply that they lack knowledge o~ Hegelian 
'I 
I Logic 1 then the logic shows itsel~ the deus ex machina we II --
clai~ it is.1 Indeed, we have an argument. 
But let us again hear Hegel's side o~ the story. 
It is an act o~ thought to include in one simple concep-
tion ::an object which itsel~ includes a large and signi~icant 
II 
histdrical conception, e.g. Man, Art, Science. It also takes 
" 
, I, 
an act o~ thought to "resolve such a conception duly to 
I, 
II isolate in idea the conceptions which it contains, and to 
II 
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2 give ,them particular names." Only as we can connect historical 
I 
" even-q,s through reason, thought, and show that the events are 
rational, can we show history as being a rational process. 
I 
As R.l1 G. Collingwood points out, Hegel is viewing historical 
. ,, 
event1s as expressions o~ thought. The connections in history 
l: 
are ri'ot between the events themselves. It is an act o~ 
thou~t which makes connections between events in history just 
as tnought made it possible ~or Kepler to establish relations 
betwe,~n astronomical phenomena. The philosophical his tor ian 
I' 
I 
must study the documents and other evidence ~forded him and 
I 
" see t;tle thought, the 11Spirit, n behind them. Collingwood goes 
on to!i point out that Hegel's dialectic principle does not 
assert that there is opposition between events. The opposition 
,, 
,, 
lies in the inward thoughts which lie behind these events. For 
example, the events which took place between the Greek civiliza-
lt 
'I 
1. ct. Walsh, IPH, 151. 
2. Hegel, PH, 68. 
0 
0 
I 
tion 1and the Roman civilization were not in opposition. The 
oppos1ition lies rather between the Greek conception of man 
I' 
rl 
and i,dea o:f life and the Roman conception o:f man and idea of 
II 
rr. life. 
;rn this context, Hegel is saying that when we take a 
'I 
synop~~ic view of these oppositions we see a pattern or 
unifopmity working toward a definite end Freedom. But 
11 
the o.~y way in which these :facts appear coherent and meaning-
·1 
II 
:ful i's in terms of this synoptic view and in terms of thought. 
'I 
The pfl.ilos ophical his tor ian is :familiar with these :forms of 
II 
exper'ience and thought and so grasps the connections. 
II 
But perhaps we can go one step further in this discussion 
II 
of Hegel's ~~~ priorism." It is worth while to point out what 
I 
might1 be called Hegel's theory of historical type. In this 
sense~ Hegel. was ~ priori in his method. This is not to say 
i. 
that he took these types and imposed them upon the historical 
I 
II 
facts,whether they fitted or not. These types only guided him 
I • 
rl 
in lobking for significance in history. But first let us 
II 
consider thes·e historical types. 
I 
'I 
The relationship between Hegel's Philosophy o:f Historz 
and t~e Phenomenology £t Mind is by no me~s easy to ascertain. 
But a:! clarification o:f this relationship is necessary in order 
II -
to understand what we mean by a 1ttheory of historical types. 11 
I' 
The Phenomenology of ~ purports to be an introduction 
1. Cff. Collingwood, IH, 118. 
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to Hegel's system.l One could characterize it as a study of 
human nature or, indeed, a history of human experience.2 In 
II 
the Phenomenolo~ ~ ~ Hegel uses many historical illustra-
' II 
tions as exemplars for his characterizations of a certain type 
of experience. The Hegelian connecting link between a type of 
I 
1: expe~ience and an historical example is important to try to 
'I 
understand. 
II 
t;rn this context, we might say that the system of exper-
li 
ience both individual and s·oc ial has for Hegel an historical 
II 
aspect and a logical aspect.3 These aspects represent both 
II 
an i~dividual aspect as found in the events of history and 
I• 
a universal aspect as found in the Idea. To obtain a connec-
tion b~twe~n historical events we must generalize or univer-
!1 
salize. For Hegel this means to connect it to the Idea. To 
'I have the Idea actualized we must individualize it, make it 
II 
concr.ete. 
11 Both f:ot these aspects 7 are satisfied-at once ~f the experience considered~y this system is treated 
1as the experience of a generalized individual. This 
'jworking conception enables us to treat experience as 
'a whole and at the same time to embrace the various 
'modes of experience as these appear discretely in 
history.4 
'I Hegel::'s use of Spirit on two levels, i.e. that of tJ;le Yforld 
I, Spiri,;t and the national spirit, are treated ?-S generalized 
95 
l. In regards to this purpose, ~t could be considered a failure. 
J''• Royce says: nFew would· have felt themselves introduced 
tb anything. n {Royce LMI, 139). 
2. W!lliam James' book, ~he Varieties of Religious Experience, 
C?uld be used to characterize the Phenomenology of Mind. 
Of. Royce, LMI; 139. 
3. Of. Hegel, POM, 46. 
4. F9otnote by B~illie {tr.), in Hegel, POM, 46. 
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'I 
indiV.iduals. History is treated as an experiential process 
wherepy Spirit becomes increasingly conscious of its Freedom. 
" Ult~ately, the true subject of history is the universal. 
II 
I' ;:rn so far as Hegel has taken these types of experience 
II 
from !!the Phenomenology of ~ and looked for them in history, 
Hege~: is _a priori. If not the detail of history, at least the 
.:1 -
outline of history is ·arrived at in this way. But when we 
I~ .I 
I, 
refle:ct that for Hegel the Phenomenolog:y: ~ Mind is a descrip-
tion "of the movement of experience and is grounded in the 
I[ 
attempt on Hegel' s part to be empirically founded, we wonde.r 
!I 
wheth,er even attributing to him this bit of ! priorism is 
'I justified. 
~owever, criticism is justified on account of one thing 
which,1 seems to be the bugbear in this connection between the 
II 
historical process and the dialectical process. This link is 
gi van:· by Royce: 
I 
II The Phaenomenologie unites logic and history 
rather by means of a reducing of the thinking pro-
cess to pragmatic terms than by means of a false 
translation of real life into the abstract cate-
gories of logic.l 
l . However, the aspect we fail to understand between Hegel's 
I• 
• 'I 
Logic 1,and his Philosophy~ Historz is his concept of neces-
1 
sity. ,~ He says, for .instance, ttthat the history in question 
has constituted the rational necessary course of the World~ 
Spirit. 112 ·world history must take the necessary next step 
1~ Royce; LMI, 145. 
2. Hegel, PH, 10. 
,, 
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in progression. The transitions involved in history are 
I 
neces
1
sary transitions •. 
II The individual traverses as a unity various 
grades of development, and remains the same indi-
1Vidual; in like manner also does a people, till 
'the Spirit which it embodies reaches the grade of 
universality. In this point lies fhe fundamental, 
'the Ideal necessity of transition. 
I 
' 
1:In speaking 
,I 
I 
of the form of constitution, Hegel very 
definitely gives us the idea of not only necessity but ·pre-
" dest~nation. The particular form of constitution, 
1iis only a step in the development of the grand 
Whole -- with its place preappointed in the process; 
·a fact which gives the highest sanction to the 
:constitution in question, and establishes its 
absolute necessity.2 
3. AES OLUTE AND FINITE 
•I 
The rest of' the problems to be deal.t with could be put 
under, the heading: "Problems arising out of' the relationship 
' 
betwe1en the Absolute and finite. 113 ' We have hinted at the 
,: 
diffi'culties entailed in Hegel's doctrine of' time in its 
I' 
relat·d.on to history. 
jl 
;understanding Hegel's use of' the concept of' the "cunning 
II 
of Re:ason" presents us with s?me dif'ficul ty also. Reason sets 
I 
men• s;: passions to work f'or _it, and His tory 11is .the slaughter-
benc~1 at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, 
1. ~egel, PH, 78. 
2. Ibid., 46. 
3. Tl:ie""problem of the· "cunning of Reason 11 could be put 
under this heading. 
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and the virtue of ind.ividual:s have been victimized. 111 The 
:I 
moral claims of individuals ~t not be brought into colli-
:1 
sion 1:with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. 
I 
Is this reconcilable with the fact that ttGod governs the· 
', . 
d 
world; the actual working of his government -- the carrying 
out qf his plan -- is the History of t1;te world? 112 This view, 
alth9ugh Hegel would declaim influence, can easily be the 
,I • 
,, justification for the sacrificing of individuals for a "divine 
'I 
CaUSe • II 
" 
::nifficul ties come about also when we consider Hegel's 
,, . 
" 
view ,I of Freedom. ·We found that the State represented the 
,, 
embodiment of concrete freedom and history pPesented us with 
;, 
the ~ealization by man that his interests and truth lie in 
the tiniversal. But we have seen that the latent abstract 
development of Spirit is regarded as necessary. 
Since mind is implicitly and actually reason, 1and reason is explicit to itself ih mind as knowl-
'1edge, worJ:d history is the necessary aevelo8ment, 
::out of the concept of mind's freedom alone. 
~It seems true that man is makin_g ~he world his own and 
II 
thereby attaining to Freedom in the sense of self-sufficiency 
I' 
,, 
and autonomy. But if the freedom of choice is to be included 
" 
within this_concrete freedom of Hegel 1s, 4 w~ ~re still left 
,, 
with ':the problem of the place of the individual in light of 
l~ 
2~ 
3. 
4. 
.I 
I 
E;egel, PH, 21· 
Ibid~, 36~ 
Knox_, HPR, 216. 
Of. Wallace, LOH, 264. 
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" ,I 
the social whole. Moreover, what could the freedom of the 
individuaL ultimately mean in Hegel's system? Vv.hat could 
"self-determinate" and "self-sufficiency" mean in a system 
whic~ holds to organicism and internal relations? The only 
II 
self~determined and self-sufficient thing would be the 
Whole, the ~solute.1 
I, • 
I:In conclusion, something needs to be said about the 
1: 
place of the individual in He~el's Philosophy££ History. 
I[ 
,!The individual does not seem to play an important role 
I 
,, 
in Hegel's system. History has to do with the World Spirit 
I 
99 
and e,xcept for a few world-historical individuals the individual 
see~' relegated to taking a back seat. 
I • 
·;The individual receives Providential care and the pious 
i1 
recognize it as such but compared to the Providence as found 
], 
,, 
in H~story it is "peddling." 
li 
:: But these instances o£ providential design 
,!are of a limited kind, and concern the accomplish-
.~nt of nothing more than the desire of the indi-
'vidual in question. But in the history of the 
.World, the Individuals we have to do with are 
Peoples; Totalities that are States. We cannot, 
:1therefore, be satisfied with w~at we may call this 
;1
11peddling 11 view of Providence. 
I • • 
But whether we accuse Hegel of losing the individual in 
Jl .. ~ -... 
,. 
the Absolute, in the state, or in the World Spirit, the indi-
J .. - • ~ 
vidual still has a part to play. A case can be made for both 
I" 
1. E'V'eh the· statement that Hegel's. Absolute is self-sufficient 
i~ at lea.St questionable. ·Josiah ·Royce states that "an 
Absolute which is'not expressed In finite"form is impossible" 
(Royce, LMI, 169). Is this a limitation upon the Absolute? 
2• H~gel, PH, 14. . 
'I 
,, 
,, 
0 
0 
,, 
I 
liThe individual must make the world a part o:r himself 1 a I 
I' part ''of his own doing. In so far as the individual embodies 
" 
a universal principle, in so far as he possesses Reason, he 
,, 
will'be working in accordance with God's Providential Plan. 
Hegel is working on the hypothesis, perhaps we could say the 
• I 
conv~ction, that the rational is overcoming the irrational 
I • t and QOntmgen • Through the efforts of the individual, the 
I 
World of Reason must become constructed, nature must become 
I' orga~ized, according to the principles of Reason. This -is 
the path toward truth, the Whole. 
I 
::Royce. states that ttthe Infinite exists only as the truth 
of the finite; the perfect can be real only as the fulfillment 
' 
of wl}at is sought by the imperfect. nl 
.i This only can be done if it is established that our 
knowledge is an expression of ourselves and the Absolute and 
I 
not of something a~ien from us.2 The subject is to make the 
I! 
world its own work. But first he must discover his own free-
" 
dom and his own infinite capabilities. This discovery of 
man's basic freedom was made in Greece with the dictum, 
h 
11Man~ know thyself. 11 The making of the world of reality into 
II 
the ~ubject's own doing took until the French Revolution. 
·I 
This 11 process of knowledge is the process of history. 
'I 
il 
1. ~oyce, LMI, 218. 
2. He·gel 1 s confidence in human knowledge no doubt is derived 
larg~ly from his epistemological monism; therein lies part 
of the rub. Does a metaphysical monism fo~low directly 
:erom this? 
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The course of history does not show us the 
Becoming of things foreign to us, but the Becoming 
of ourselves and of our own knowledga.l 
,Without fear of baing too histrionic, let ux say that 
Hege+, believes man has a task to perform and that is to 
realize his own freedom and. his place in the universe. This 
task~ this striving to find a place, is expressed wonderfully 
II 
by Walt Whitman in one of his b~tter poems: 
A noiseless patient spider, 
1I mark1 d where on a little promontory 
11 it stood isolated, 
:
1
Mark' d hO\"l to explore the vacant vast 
;: · surrounding, 
It launch1 d forth filament, filgment, 
': filament, out of itself. 
Ever unreeling them, ever tirelessly 
speeding them. 
1
And you 0 my soul where you stand, 
Surrounded, detached, in measureless 
oceans of space, 
Ceaselessly musing, venturing, throwing, 
1
, seeking the spheres to connect them. 
1
1 Till the bridge you will need be form' d, 
'
1 till the ductile anchor hold, 
,:Till the gossamer thread you fling 
catch somewhere, 0 my soul. 
1. 'Hegel, HP, 4. 
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ABSTRACT 
::w..e. have found that Hegel's philosophy of history is in 
org~ic connection with the rest of his philosophical system. 
His liypothesis, the concept of Reason, has been taken from 
his system. Any understanding of his philosophy of history 
~ I 
entails some acquaintance with his system as a whole. 
,l An understanding of Hegel's philosophy of history and, 
indeed, his thought in general, is made much easier if the 
" 
direction in which he is going, the end he has in mind, is 
i! 
complehended. Hegel's philosophy of history is an attempt 
" to d~scover a meaning behind the entire course of the world. 
,I 
The ~mpirical and historical facts are giv~n to the philo-
'I 
soph~cal historian; it is his task to ascertain the signifi-
cance of these facts and the significance of their particular 
sequ~nce. Hegel, by taking a ca.mprehensive and synoptic view 
d 
of the world's history, gives us, at first by way of hypo-
,, 
I 
thes;s, the final cause of the world's history: Reason. 
Reason is the uinward guiaing sou1 11 of the world's history 
and that history presents us with a rational process. 
11Hegel' s concept of Reason is quite comprehensive. It is 
•' 
man's substantial being and lies implicit within him. In thi~ 
sens~, the history of the world presents us man's gradual dis-
cipline of his own uncontrolled natural will. In terms of the 
Absolute, Reason is the Providential design at work in the 
102 
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I 
world's history, and as such it is a purposive activity. 
II • I 
I! Hegel's philosophy of history is, then, teleological. The 
histqry of the world offers us God's pu~osive and rational 
II 
activity and in this respect history is, for Hegel, a 
n 
I[ 
Theodicaea. 
"We have found also that another concept inextricably 
boun~ up with his system is the concept of Freedom. Self-
,, 
conscious Reason, or Spirit, is gradually becoming conscious 
I' 
of its own freedom. Change in the realm of Spirit shows us 
an ~pulse of perfectibility. Freedom means for Hegel the 
" 
Conscious realization upon the part of man that his interests, 
" II 
his inmost being, lie with the Universal. This is concrete 
Freedom and the State represents its embodiment. 
,, 
::The State then plays_ a central :;role in Hegel's philosophy 
[I 
of h~story• It represents the freedom of man in conscious 
union with the Whole. History presents us with state or 
, 
political forms which have shown the advancement of man's 
II 
II 
recognition of his own freedom. Hegel's division of the 
,, 
world's histo~y is in accordance with these stages. 
!I 
,:The course of the world's history is one to'llvard concrete-
ness ·1and inclusiveness. ~ne success with which a given sta~e 
integrates its citizens contained within the state determines 
" the s''tage at which that society has reached. In the East man 
is bll;inded by the "Sun" and as such he is obedient to an 
abstr.act and external law. 
il 
The "negati0n 11 of this is beginning 
,, 
to be, realized by the Graeco-Roman civilizations, that external 
104 
law ~d custom have no authority over the individual and that 
tl 
he s~ould follow the dictates of his own conscience and reason. 
It 
The ~•synthesis 11 of these two is the realization of the German 
,, 
wor14 that their own conscience and reason are already there 
in tl;l.e law and Reason contained in Society and the State. 
II 
liThe freedom attained in history by man~ then, is the 
tl 
I[ 
freedom from the irrational control of nature while at the 
I• 
'I 
same .,time the freedom from uncontrolled natural will. 
li 
1:In regard to the empirical facts of history, the actual 
even~s of h;story, Hegel does amazingly well. He considers 
the natural, geographical, end economic factors in history. 
, . 
. we have found that the criticism charging Hegel with 
a priorism is not wholly founded but that certain difficulties 
' I 
•' 
do c~~e about when we look closely at ~e relation which he 
holds!' between Absolute and finite mind. The "cunning of 
,, 
Reason 11 hardly seems reconcilable with the Theodicaea and 
,, 
there!: are difficulties in understanding what freedom as self-
• ,I 
I 
suffi,?iency could mean in an absolutistic system. 
0 
0 
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